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In September 2020, the U.S. Forest Service took the extraordinary step of
closing all 18 national forests in California. The risk of catastrophic fire had become
so acute that tolerating any human visitors—who could ignite more—was no longer
tenable.1 Damages from the fires of 2020 are still being tallied, but the catastrophe is
hard to deny. Five of the state’s six largest fires on record occurred in 2020.2
Migrating birds dropped from the sky by the thousands from some combination of
asphyxiation, exhaustion, and starvation.3 An estimated 80% of California’s
watersheds had recently burned by 2019, leaving them immediately vulnerable to
mudslides.4 The smoke has become the West’s worst air pollution source by far.5
Proximity to national forests, long what homebuyers craved, is now a grave threat
across the West.6
The outlines of the problem are apparent in the Forest Service’s budget. In
fiscal year (FY) 2020, Congress spent $8.2 billion on the agency, 36% more than in
FY 2011 in constant dollars.7 Almost $5 billion of that was on fire.8 As more people
build in fire-prone areas, more has been and will be spent suppressing fires.9 A 2011
statute creating a revolving fund has consistently failed to cover those costs—leaving

1.
One estimate put ignitions in California at 97% anthropogenic. See J.K. Balch et al., HumanStarted Wildfires Expand the Fire Niche Across the United States, 114(11) PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2946, 2947
(2017).
2.
See Andrew Freedman & Diana Leonard, California Wildfires Erupt Amid Strong Santa Ana
Winds,
Threat
Could
Last
Into
Next
Week,
WASH. POST,
Dec.
3,
2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/12/03/california-wildfires-santa-ana-winds/ (“The state
[just had] its worst wildfire season on record, with about 4.2 million acres burned, more than double the
acreage in the previous record-breaking year. At least 10,488 structures have been destroyed and 31 people
killed. Five of the top six largest fires on record in the state have occurred this season.”).
3.
See Kari Paul, Dying Birds and the Fires: Scientists Work to Unravel a Great Mystery, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 18, 2020, available at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/oct/18/dyingbirds-and-the-fires-scientists-work-to-unravel-a-great-mystery.
4.
See CAL. COUNCIL ON SCI. & TECH., THE COSTS OF WILDFIRE IN CALIFORNIA: AN
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 130-35 (2020) [hereinafter
“WILDFIRE IN CALIFORNIA”].
5.
See Marshall Burke et al., The Changing Risk and Burden of Wildfire in the United States, 118(2)
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. (2021), https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/118/2/e2011048118.full.pdf.
6.
See David E. Calkin et al., How Risk Management Can Prevent Future Wildfire Disasters in the
Wildland-Urban
Interface,
111(2)
PROC.
NAT’L
ACAD.
SCI.
746
(2014),
https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs_other/rmrs_2014_calkin_d002.pdf.
7.
See KATIE HOOVER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46557, FOREST SERVICE APPROPRIATIONS:
TEN-YEAR DATA AND TRENDS (2020).
8.
See KATIE HOOVER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46583, FEDERAL WILDFIRE MANAGEMENT:
TEN-YEAR FUNDING TRENDS AND ISSUES (2020). Counting the Department of Interior wildfire
spending, the total was over $6.1 billion. Id. at 3.
9.
See Burke et al., supra note 5, at 2-6; Volcker C. Radeloff et al., Rapid Growth of the US
Wildland-Urban Interface Raises Wildfire Risk, 115 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 3314 (2018),
https://www.pnas.org/content/115/13/3314.
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the agency to more borrowing from its regular accounts.10 The more research that
has been done on treating fuels, the more unlikely it appears that we will treat our
way out.11 Congress, it is fair to say, is hemorrhaging money on fire in the national
forests with little prospect of improving.12

I. INTRODUCTION: PARTS AND WHOLES
By 1970 a collection of statutes governing the national forests had
It was then, though, that Congress aimed for more—for a whole of integral
parts.14 That whole began from a plurality of land uses persisting over time, later
becoming an idealization of that pluralism.15 Like the Clean Air and Clean Water
Acts, the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974
(FRRRPA)16 embodied hopes for an integral legislative scheme.17 Later Congresses
amassed.13

10. In the 2011 FLAME Act, Pub. L. No. 111-88 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1748(a)-(b)), Congress
created a “no-year” account for wildfire suppression spending where funds unused in the year of
appropriation could accumulate until being spent. This reserve fund has frequently failed to cover fire
suppression expenses, leaving the Service to a variety of other emergency gap-filling mechanisms,
including borrowing from other discretionary spending accounts within the agency. See CONG. RSCH.
SERV. R46583, supra note 8, at 3-6.
11. See Jason Kreitler et al., Cost-Effective Fuel Treatment Planning: A Theoretical Justification and
Case Study, 29 INT’L J. WILDLAND FIRE 42, 42 (2020) (noting a Forest Service estimate that 42% of
system needed treatment while about $300 million annually spent on treatment amounted to less than 5%
of need); James K. Agee and Carl N. Skinner, Basic Principles of Forest Fuel Reduction Treatments, 211
FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 83 (2005) (noting major uncertainties in the efficacy of most treatments).
12. Cf. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY 456-65 (2014) (calling
the U.S. Forest Service the epitome of a decaying system for its handling of fire amid multiple, often
conflicting legal mandates).
13. This included the Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11 (1897), the Weeks
Act, ch. 186, 36 Stat. 962 (1911), the Clark-McNary Act, Pub. L. No. 68-270, 43 Stat. 653 (1924), the
McSweeney-McNary Act, ch. 678, 45 Stat. 699 (1928), the Knutson-Vandenberg Act, 46 Stat. 527 (1930),
the Sustained Yield Forestry Act, ch. 146, 58 Stat. 132 (1944), the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, Pub.
L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (MUSYA), the Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964),
and Pub. L. No. 88-657, 78 Stat. 1089 (1964).
14. See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 563-606 (1968);
James L. Huffman, A History of Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENV’T L. 239, 275-78 (1978); SAMUEL
T. DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY 315-20 (2d ed. 1980).
15. FRRRPA joined Congress’s first references to a “National Forest System” (NFS) to a mandate
that the Secretary of Agriculture “take such action as will assure that the development and administration
of the renewable resources of the National Forest System are in full accord with the concepts for multiple
use and sustained yield of products and services as set forth in the Multiple Use Sustained-Yield Act of
1960.” Pub. L. No. 93-378, § 8, 88 Stat. 476, 479 (1974) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1607).
16. Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (1974) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610). The
Forest Service refers to this statute as the “RPA.”
17. See DENNIS C. LE MASTER, DECADE OF CHANGE: THE REMAKING OF FOREST SERVICE
AUTHORITY DURING THE 1970S 33-53 (1984).
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followed that lead, at least in part.18 Inter-statutory composites of their kind, whether
from some “one-Congress fiction”19 or notions of legislative supremacy,20 bring
special interpretive troubles, though. Congress’s membership, leadership,
organization, and interests are always evolving.21 For our national forests, though,
past statutes have characteristically served to focus present deliberations, new
legislation, and institutional evolution. This critical fact is too often overlooked.
FRRRPA’s biggest amendment package arrived only two years later as a
“National Forest Management Act” (NFMA).22 NFMA coincided with the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA),23 a statute of similar proportion and
ambition aimed principally at the Interior Department lands.24 NFMA was in many
respects a culmination of negotiations begun in 1974,25 if not before.26 High-yield
timber and other commodity production transitioned through it from a pitched value
conflict to so many entries in a balance sheet to be refined into a grand unified

18. The Service’s implementation of RPA and its amendments have long fed a critique of the NFS
as a money-losing, mismanaged environmental disaster. See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, supra note 12; Robert H.
Nelson, Our Languishing Public Lands, 161 POL’Y REV. 45, 46 (2012); RANDAL O’TOOLE, REFORMING
THE FOREST SERVICE (1988).
19. The “one Congress” legal fiction holds that all statutes should be regarded as the product of a
singular authority. Professor Buzbee’s account of this fiction in the Supreme Court grounded it in
aspirations to inter-statutory consistency, presumptions that Congress knows the state of the law when it
legislates, textualism, and precedent. William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory
Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2000).
20. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 276-88 (2009) (arguing
that identifying a singular legislative intent reflects the primacy of legislation). The struggle for power
between the Congress and President was at a fever pitch during and following 1974. See ERIC SCHICKLER,
DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.
CONGRESS 194-204 (2001).
21. See WALTER J. OLESZEK ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY
PROCESS 1-37 (11th ed. 2020).
22.

Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614).

23.

Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785).

24. Interpreters have been nearly unanimous in the belief that FLPMA and NFMA bore no
legislative history in common. See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland
Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENV’T L. 1, 5-9 (1983). FLPMA,
however, does share important historical and structural similarities with the NFS statutes. See infra note
161 and accompanying text.
25.

See LE MASTER, supra note 17, at 55-83.

26. As often noted, some of NFMA’s signals on timber production originated in the so-called
“Church Guidelines,” a 1972 report—unpublished—from the Forests Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs which set forth specific “guidelines” on “clearcutting” NFS
lands. See Edward P. Cliff, Timber Resources, 54 U. DEN. L.J. 507, 509 (1977). But it was then-Forest
Service Chief Cliff who decided after Church’s subcommittee proffered the guidelines that the Service
would follow them. See Stephen H. Spurr, Clearcutting on National Forests, 21 NAT. RES. J. 223, 231 (1981).
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calculus.27 Congress incorporated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)28
directly into the statutes,29 no less for its “action forcing” impact statement tool30
than for its declaration of a national “environmental policy.”31
Compositing these different statutes into some coherent whole presents
difficult questions about their interpretation. FRRRPA, NFMA, and the others, for
example, unequivocally took up an ideal first legislated in the monumentally vague
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA) of 1960.32 MUSYA commanded the
use of “the renewable surface resources of the national forests for multiple use and
sustained yield of the several products and services obtained therefrom.”33 MUSYA
27.
as 1960).

Cf. Huffman, supra note 14, at 275-79 (observing that such a transition had beginnings as early

28.
(2012)).

Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347

29. NEPA, like MUSYA, was cross-referenced repeatedly in FRRRPA and NFMA. See infra note
34 and accompanying text.
30. NEPA’s “detailed statements,” to be circulated among other federal agencies with knowledge
and/or jurisdictional authority, were Congress’s original uses of peer assessment and self-correction in the
face of uncertainty about environmental consequences. See SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES
THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
(1984). NFMA § 6(g)(1) directed the Service to “specify[] procedures” assuring the adoption of its land
and resource management plans (LRMPs) “in accordance” with NEPA § 102(2)(C)’s impact statement
procedures. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1).
31. NEPA’s declaration of a national “policy” was an innovation emulated in NFMA § 4(d)(1)—
where Congress declared it the “policy of the Congress that all forested lands in the [NFS] shall be
maintained in appropriate forest cover.” 16 U.S.C. § 1601(d)(1) (emphasis added). NEPA’s declaration was
also incorporated in FRRRPA § 3’s mandate that “the Program” be developed “in accordance with
principles set forth” in NEPA and MUSYA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1602. Finally, NEPA’s mandate that all
federal agencies “utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach” for the “integrated use of the natural and
social sciences,” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A), was echoed in NFMA’s requirement that its LRMPs “be
prepared by an interdisciplinary team . . . based on inventories of the applicable resources of the forest,”
16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(3).
32. See Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960). NFMA § 19 added a new section to MUSYA,
retroactively renaming it “the ‘Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.’” Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 19, 90
Stat. 2962 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 528 note (2012)). MUSYA itself famously—and
retroactively—declared it the “policy of the Congress” that “the national forests are established and shall be
administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 528 (2012) (emphasis added). The establishment purposes of each of the national forests were, if not
unique to each, varied historically and geographically. See GATES, supra note 14, at 531-606.
33. Pub. L. No. 86-517, § 2, 74 Stat. 215, 215 (1960) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 529
(2012)). The Act, in turn, defined multiple use and sustained yield separately. See 16 U.S.C. § 531(a)
(defining “multiple use” as “management of all the various renewable surface resources of the national
forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people;
making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or related services over areas
large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs
and conditions; that some land will be used for less than all of the resources; and harmonious and
coordinated management of the various resources, each with the other, without impairment of the
productivity of the land, with consideration being given to the relative values of the various resources, and
not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit
output”); id. at § 531(b) (defining “sustained yield of the several products and services” as “the
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is cross-referenced nine times between FRRRPA and NFMA.34 But MUSYA only
directed the Service to maximize its named uses—“outdoor recreation, range, timber,
watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes”35—while hedging that these were
“supplemental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes for which the national forests
were established.”36 Even if that meant simply perpetual non-declining yields, it
ignored the likelihood of changed future valuations of such yields.37 Furthermore, it
was silent as to the spatial or temporal scales at which the maximizing was to be done.
Atop all that, the 1978 Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Research Act
(FRRRRA)38 took over prescribing what Congress’s Public Land Law Review
Commission had first recommended39 on the urgent needs for more basic research—
prescriptions paralleling those in FRRRPA and NFMA.
Consider the contrast with the 1964 Wilderness Act, a law aimed directly
at the national forests that prompted scores of follow-on wilderness-designating
statutes, which went unmentioned in the NFS statutes.40 Wilderness designations

achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various
renewable resources of the national forests without impairment of the productivity of the land”).
34. MUSYA had already been construed as less constraint than Congressional guidance before
FRRRPA was even being debated. See Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 123 (D. Alaska 1971)
(rejecting challenge to timber sale under MUSYA because “Congress ha[d] given no indication as to the
weight to be assigned each value and it must be assumed that the decision as to the proper mix of uses
within any particular area is left to the sound discretion and expertise of the Forest Service.”).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 528. While this list may have seemed exhaustive in 1960, it omits mention of uses
such as artisanal foraging, biomedical prospecting, carbon sequestration, energy development, tourism –
and wilderness preservation.
36.

Id.

37. See R.W. Behan, Political Popularity and Conceptual Nonsense: The Strange Case of Sustained Yield
Forestry, 8 ENV’T L. 309, 315 (1978).
38. See Pub. L. No. 95-307, 92 Stat. 352 (1978). FRRRRA was joined by the Cooperative Forestry
Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-313, 92 Stat. 365 (1978), and the Renewable Resources Extension Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-306, 92 Stat. 349 (1978), each of which amended the funding and coordination of different
research and extension works.
39. The Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) was chartered in 1964 by legislation
originating in the House and Senate Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs. See Hon. Wayne N.
Aspinall, The Public Land Law Review Commission: Origins and Goals, 7 NAT. RES. J. 149, 152 (1967)
(discussing origins of Pub. L. No. 88-606). That comprehensive review of all public land laws culminated
in a massive report to the President. See PUB. LAND L. REV. COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S
LAND (1970) (explaining PLLRC’s 137 numbered recommendations). FRRRRA began from those
recommendations and has since become the hub of Congressional prioritizations on research. See id. at 6364, 80-81.
40. Despite fourteen other statutes NFMA and FRRRPA referenced, not one mention is made of
the Wilderness Act. By contrast, FLPMA explicitly incorporated the Wilderness Act and wilderness
reviews within its architecture. See Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 603, 90 Stat. 2785 (1976) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 1782). This silence may stem from the tangled history of “roadless areas” and the reviews
thereof within the national forests. See CRAIG W. ALLIN, THE POLITICS OF WILDERNESS
PRESERVATION 160-67 (1982). But the omission is still curious given NFMA’s inclusion of “wilderness”
among the “products and services” to be “obtained” from the NFS supposedly “in accordance with”
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have been Congress’s chief legal constraint on multiple use and, derivatively, the
Service.41 In 118 statutes since 1964, wilderness designations have been concentrated
overwhelmingly on the NFS.42 The original forest reserves may have been the origin
of agency rules with the force of law,43 but every such rule is modally subordinate to
statutory constraints like the Wilderness Act’s.44 Designated wilderness is, thus, a
form of legal exclusion from the NFS statutes. For wilderness areas are normative
regimes unto themselves45 even as they remain integrated into their wider
landscapes.46
A similar challenge is recognizable in ecosystem science, such as it is.
Biologists and ecologists have struggled mightily to find an optimal scale at which to
study cells, organisms, populations, meta-populations, communities, etc.47
Distinguishing parts from wholes and wholes apart from one another has defined a
MUSYA—which, of course, made no mention of “wilderness” services in 1960. See NFMA § 6(e)(1)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1)).
41. The silence is more curious given the Act’s origins—through Congressman Aspinall’s
supposed bargain allowing the Wilderness Act to pass in return for the PLLRC—in the House Interior
and Insular Affairs Committee. See DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 14, at 231-32. By 2009 and the mammoth
Omnibus Public Land Management Act, Pub. L. No. 111-11, the National Wilderness Preservation System
had swelled from approximately nine million to more than 109.7 million acres across more than 750
designated areas. See ROSS W. GORTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41649, WILDERNESS LAWS: STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AND PROHIBITED AND PERMITTED USES 1-2 (2011). As John Leshy observed, wilderness
statutes controlling NFS governance have been Congress’s favorite tool for constraining Forest Service
discretion. See John D. Leshy, Public Land Policy After the Trump Administration: Is This a Turning Point?,
31 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY, & ENV’T L. REV. 471, 472-86 (2020).
42. No fewer than ninety of the 118 total statutes designating wilderness since 1964 have created
or rearranged wilderness areas in the NFS. See CONG. RSCH. SERV. R41649, supra note 41, at App. B.
This close involvement has not been lost on reviewing courts. See infra notes 230-35 and accompanying
text.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523
(1911); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917). Rules of this rank are said to bind
the agency until changed. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-67 (1954);
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 753-54 (1979).
44.

See KATZMANN, infra note 252 and accompanying text.

45.

See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.

46. This is a becoming an important wedge in wildfire science and management. See Carol Miller
& Gregory H. Aplet, Progress in Wilderness Fire Science: Embracing Complexity, 114(3) J. FORESTRY 373
(2016); James K. Agee, Wilderness Fire Science: A State-of-Knowledge Review, USDA Forest Serv. Proc.
RMRS-P-15-VOL-5 (2000); see infra notes 236-43 and accompanying text.
47. See JAMES MACLAURIN & KIM STERELNY, WHAT IS BIODIVERSITY? 21-26 (2008); Kurt Jax,
Ecological Units: Definitions and Applications, 81 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 237, 241 (2006) (“The problem of
determining boundaries of ecological units has always plagued ecologists.”). The lack of consensus
surrounding fundamental units prevents ecology from settling many law-like generalities. See John H.
Lawton, Are There General Laws in Ecology? 84 OIKOS 177 (1999). Indeed, “the uniqueness of biological
entities and phenomena” is first among the “major differences between biology and physical sciences.”
ERNEST MAYR, TOWARD A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY: OBSERVATIONS OF AN EVOLUTIONIST
34 (1988). This is both the emergence and indeterminacy of biological relationships: “[w]hen two entities are
combined at a high level of integration, not all the properties of the new entity are necessarily a logical or
predictable consequence of the properties of the components.” Id.
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century of biological thought.48 Nowhere has this been more evident than in forest
ecology.49 What community dynamics exist, what population dynamics exist, and
what is the natural integrity of forested areas—such questions remain unanswered
after decades of scientific work.50 They are part of a broader, urgent race to resolve
the defining entities of ecological science.51
The 1970s Congresses still believed that major breakthroughs in biology
and ecology were possible and could potentially transform multiple-use
management.52 Yet the NFS statutes, like the many wilderness designations since,
reflect public political choices.53 Then, as now, the search for environmental quality

48. See MAYR, supra note 47, at 100 (calling the “rather unfortunate” focus on units of natural
selection the cause of “protracted controversy . . . as to whether the gene, the individual (genotype), the
group, or the species is the ‘unit of selection,’ or all of them”); Robert H. Whittaker, Classification of
Natural Communities, 28(1) BOTANICAL REV. 1, 158 (1962) (noting simultaneous attacks on the unit
assumptions of community ecology in Russia, France, and the United States). For many ecologists, scale
is the basic property defining all others. See, e.g., Simon A. Levin, The Problem of Pattern and Scale in
Ecology, 73 ECOLOGY 1943, 1959 (1992) (“[N]o description of the variability and predictability of the
environment makes sense without reference to the particular range of scales that are relevant to the
organisms or processes being examined.”). Interpreting habitat selection is no exception. See Gordon H.
Orians & James F. Wittenberger, Spatial and Temporal Scales in Habitat Selection, 137 AM. NATURALIST
S29 (1991).
49. See Robert B. Keiter, The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem Revisited: Law, Science, and the Pursuit
of Ecosystem Management in an Iconic Landscape, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2020) [hereinafter Keiter, “GYE
Revisited”]; Robert B. Keiter, Toward a National Conservation Network Act: Transforming Landscape
Conservation on the Public Lands into Law, 42 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 61 (2018) [hereinafter Keiter, “National
Network”]; Robert B. Keiter, Ecological Concepts, Legal Standards, and Public Land Law: An Analysis and
Assessment, 44 NAT. RES. J. 943 (2004); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of
Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994); Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology and the
Law: Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911 (1994).
50. See, e.g., LARRY D. HARRIS, THE FRAGMENTED FOREST: ISLAND BIOGEOGRAPHY AND THE
PRESERVATION OF BIOTIC DIVERSITY 71-92 (1984) (reviewing efforts to derive “species-area
relationships” from forested areas with their metaphoric treatment as islands consistent with insular
biogeography); OSWALD J. SCHMITZ, THE NEW ECOLOGY: RETHINKING A SCIENCE FOR THE
ANTHROPOCENE 69-105 (2017) (observing that humans’ “domesticated nature” has shown a surprising
tendency to evolve rapidly as habitat fragments, resources change, and phenotypic plasticities yield diverse
adaptive capacities).
51. Accessible introductions and explanations of the endeavor include SCHMITZ, NEW ECOLOGY,
supra note 50, and OSWALD J. SCHMITZ, RESOLVING ECOSYSTEM COMPLEXITY (2010).
52. See TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 17-37, 45-58. The NFMA’s Congressional finding that “new
knowledge” derived from “coordinated public and private research programs” would “promote a sound
technical and ecological base for effective management, use, and protection” of NFS resources was key.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1600(4). Behind these formalized findings lay a great deal of Congressional committee
work and “regular order” legislative business wherein the possibilities that science and scientific expertise
could resolve multiple-use conflicts had been the center of attention. See LE MASTER, supra note 17, at 383; PAUL W. HIRT, A CONSPIRACY OF OPTIMISM: MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS SINCE
WORLD WAR TWO 254-65 (1994).
53. See JAMES G. LEWIS, THE FOREST SERVICE AND THE GREATEST GOOD: A CENTENNIAL
HISTORY 187-202 (2005); ALLIN, supra note 40; cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and Congress: Should Judges
Disdain Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1998) (distinguishing a “political history” of a statute

134

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 11:1

was conceived chiefly as the pursuit of diffuse public interests in the face of narrower,
more fixed private stakes.54 The national forests were, thus, both an American
heritage and a wealth of private stakes protected by law.55 Not surprisingly, then, in
more than 40 years with these statutes, the legal constraints on Service discretion
that they have entrenched have been less intentional than circumstantial, even
accidental. Though environmental quality disputes remain abundant in the NFS,
timber production has yielded to managing for wildfire, drought, watershed
protection, atmospheric cycling of CO2 and water vapor, carbon storage, and the
demand for fuel as touchstones.56
The ecological sciences’ high profile within contemporary forestry arguably
has made the NFS statutes into a cautionary tale in legislative problem-solving. As
ever, the Service is awash in “data, views, [and] arguments”57 sufficient to justify to
reviewing courts a vast range of discretionary actions. Yet, it faces too many crises to
count. Wildfire is emblematic. Atop mountains of research, guidance, plans,
memoranda-of-understanding, and federal appropriations laws, there sit the receipts
of billions of dollars spent fighting something we barely understand while lives
continue to be lost or ruined, communities burned, and the predictive knowledge
needed to overcome these tragedies remains out of reach.58
We can do better. What I will call divisionary interpretations of the NFS
statutes took root from the clearcutting controversies that dominated many national
forests in the 1970s.59 This framing focused on the statutes’ discrete provisions, first
from its “legislative history” and arguing that a purposive approach to interpretation paying respectful
attention to the former avoids aggrandizing the judicial role).
54. See PAUL J. CULHANE, PUBLIC LAND POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE
FOREST SERVICE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT (1981); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1676-88 (1975) (tracing the “problem
of discretion” from New Deal era to present as one of checking administrative power both for its failure
to identify public interests and because it too often unduly favors highly organized private interests).
55. Then, as now, the NFS consisted of more than 150 units administered both separately and
collectively as more than 175 million acres of United States’ property. A tangled history of judicial review
of the governance of that property predated the statutes here at issue. See Antonin Scalia, Sovereign
Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands
Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867 (1970).
56. See, e.g., Virginia H. Dale et al., How is Wood-Based Pellet Production Affecting Forest Conditions
in the Southeastern United States?, 396 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 143, 143 (2017) (noting increasing
interactivity of European demand for bioenergy, U.S. pellet production, and carbon sequestration in U.S.
forests); Richard Birdsey et al., Climate, Economic, and Environmental Impacts of Producing Wood for
Bioenergy, 13 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 05201 (2018).
57. As Michael Hertz once observed, this phrase—from the first sentence of 5 U.S.C. § 553(c),
the APA’s provision on notice and comment rulemaking—assumes that those contributing “data, views,
or arguments” have something valuable to contribute. See Michael Herz, “Data, Views, or Arguments”: A
Rumination, 22 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 351, 357 (2013).
58. Part IV suggests comparisons to programs where the law has effectively co-evolved with and
spurred the development of usable scientific knowledge. See infra note 325 and accompanying text.
59. Wilkinson and Anderson’s meticulous study of the FRRRPA and NFMA is the locus classicus
of this narrative. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE
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on timber production,60 later on others. They stressed the political struggle over
Forest Service discretion—which the Service was said to have won—surrounding the
individual provisions.61 Each of the provisions legislated pertaining to the Service’s
management choices, these interpreters argued, eventually boiled down to little or
no judicially enforceable constraint on the Service.62 Most judicial opinions construing
the statutes largely (if not uniformly) confirm that assessment.63 Indeed, such

PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS (1986). The accounts following them in whole or in part are
many. See ALYSON FLOURNOY ET AL., REGULATIONS IN NAME ONLY: HOW THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION’S NATIONAL FOREST PLANNING RULE FREES THE FOREST SERVICE FROM
MANDATORY STANDARDS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2005); Federico Cheever, Four Failed Forest
Standards: What We Can Learn from the History of the National Forest Management Act’s Substantive Timber
Management Provisions, 77 OR. L. REV. 601 (1998); Julie A. Weiss, Eliminating the National Forest
Management Act’s Diversity Requirement as a Substantive Standard, 27 ENV’T L. 641 (1997); Charles
Wilkinson, The National Forest Management Act: the Twenty Years Behind, the Twenty Years Ahead, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 659 (1997); Jack Tuholske & Beth Brennan, The National Forest Management Act: Judicial
Interpretation of a Substantive Environmental Statute, 15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 53 (1994); Michael C. Blumm,
Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use” Failed, 18 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 405, 419-22
(1994); Stephanie M. Parent, The National Forest Management Act: Out of the Woods and Back to the Courts?,
22 ENV’T L. 699 (1992); George C. Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning on Federal Lands,
61 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 336-44 (1990). Wilkinson and Anderson’s study even appeared in several
important judicial opinions as well. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 974 F. Supp. 905, 917 (E.D. Tex.
1997); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir. 1995).
60. The Forest Service itself seeded this narrative in a publication it styled Current Information
Report No. 16 in December 1976. See USDA FOREST SERV., CI-16, THE NATIONAL FOREST
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 2 (Dec. 1976) (“It should be emphasized that the Congressional action was
one of additional policy direction and endorsement, rather than rebuke. . . . In many areas, Congress
indicated it rather liked what the Forest Service was doing . . . .”). Wilkinson and Anderson framed their
opus into range, timber, water, minerals, wildlife, recreation, and wilderness, and drew out histories
thereof, culminating in the 1970s statutes. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 59, at v. Their
framing of discrete resources, the Service’s “timber bias,” and its discretionary balancing of all the uses
and values may not have been original with them. See, e.g., Cliff, supra note 26; Spur, supra note 26. But
their exhaustive documentation and limning of various legislators’ roles, the Service’s involvement and
regulatory history, and provision-by-provision analyses set the standard for scholarship on the statutes.
61. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 69-90; Cheever, supra note 59, at 635-56;
Blumm, supra note 59, at 422-28; Parent, supra note 59, at 708-28. Agencies are thought to be among the
most effective political actors. See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2217 (2005) (describing Congressional use of agencies to check other agencies). And
several accounts maintain that the Service “won” the struggle over its discretion in Congress as the bills
were being formulated. See, e.g., Cheever, supra note 59, at 643; O’TOOLE, supra note 18, at 98-110; HIRT,
supra note 52, at 260-65. Others locate that victory in the courts and the cases later brought challenging
the Service’s practices under the statutes. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 59, at 650-55; Cheever, supra note 59,
at 656-91.
62. See Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 677-80 (concluding that the statutes require extensive planning
and coordination by the Forest Service without requiring demonstrable results); Cheever, supra note 59,
at 705 (concluding the statutes’ standards are “inadequate” and “fail to communicate an intelligible
message”); Weiss, supra note 59, at 642 (finding that the statutes’ “seemingly clear and decisive language”
proved difficult to translate from their “congressional intent”).
63.

See infra Part III(B).
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framing has become so familiar it begs the question: why an effort to challenge it
now?64
Wilkinson and Anderson’s 1985 study, which was the deepest plumbing of
the timber conflicts roiling the 93rd and 94th Congresses, lacked the hindsight of 35
years with the laws’ interlocking pieces. Decades of experience with these laws, in
tandem with late developments in the special biological sciences, have revealed what
Wilkinson and others could not have known. Second, and just as important, the
norms of statutory interpretation in our courts have shifted considerably toward
textualism since the 1970s and even since the 1980s and ’90s, when the divisionary
framing had taken root.65 It is hard to overstate the importance of these changes to
the law’s practical effect in the forest. Combined, they have put the statutes in a
different light,66 one that reveals more compositional intentions.
The compositional intentions emerge when we appreciate the epistemic and
coordination problems Congress was aiming to resolve. First, Congress faced serious
principal/agent issues67 on NFS lands. Its expert agency, the Forest Service, had long
been pursuing a constrained optimization of daunting scale and scope.68 It was a history
that set the Service apart from the typical agency Congress stands up.69 The Service
was the prototypical “expert system” social scientists had promised could solve
complex, emergent public problems.70 Second, by the 1970s the Service had accrued
64. Several histories of the Forest Service and NFS mirror Wilkinson and Anderson’s divisionary
framing. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 53, at 158-61; JOHN FEDKIW, MANAGING MULTIPLE USES ON
NATIONAL FORESTS, 1905-1995 99-112 (1996); HIRT, supra note 52, at 254-65; DAVID A. CLARY, TIMBER
AND THE FOREST SERVICE 190-94 (1986).
65. In essence, “legislative history” employing “bits and pieces of legislative reports or debates to
resolve particular issues of meaning” has lost most of its significance in our statutory interpretation
practices. Strauss, supra note 53, at 243 n.3. By contrast, fitting the several statutes enacted in the 93d,
94th, 95th Congresses together to cohere is more the kind of legislative history that matters.
66. Cf. Ganesh Sitamaran, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 82-83 (2015)
(arguing that academics have recently dug deeper into legislative practices and procedures and that, “in
path-breaking articles, Professors Nourse, Bressman, and Gluck have conducted empirical research on
legislative drafting” that has refuted long-held beliefs in the legal academy and profession).
67. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57,
61 (1989) (“The agency problem arises because (a) the principal and the agent have different goals and (b)
the principal cannot determine if the agent has behaved appropriately.”).
68. A constrained optimization is any effort to optimize an objective function as to some number
(n) of variables given certain constraints thereon. The objective function may be a cost/energy function
(to be minimized) or a benefit/utility function (to be maximized), while constraints may be hard (setting
conditions for the n variables that must be met) or soft (with varying penalties if and to the extent goals
are not met).
69. We might say the Service presented Congress with a novice/expert problem. See Alvin I.
Goldman, Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?, 63 PHIL. & PHENOMOLOGICAL RSCH. 85, 89-90 (2001)
(describing a novice/expert problem as one in which a party who lacks the basis necessary to evaluate
another’s claims to knowledge must do so and contrasting it with expert/expert problems in which two
parties with the same expertise must evaluate each other’s claims).
70. See HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR
(RFF Press 1960). Kaufman’s classic examined the Service from the ranger and ranger district to its top
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prominent critics.71 Yet its unique role of either conducting or funding the bulk of
the original research into its own central questions dated at least to the 1920s,72 if not
earlier.73 In the so-called McSweeney-McNary Act, Congress directed the service to
conduct such investigations, experiments and tests [as needed to]
. . . determine, demonstrate, and promulgate the best methods of
reforestation and of growing, managing, and utilizing timber,
forage, and other forest products, of maintaining favorable
conditions of water flow and the prevention of erosion, of
protecting timber and other forest growth from fire, insects,
disease, or other harmful agents, of obtaining the fullest and most
effective use of forest lands, and to determine and promulgate the
economic considerations which should underlie the establishment
of sound policies for the management of forest land and the
utilization of forest products.74
The vast network of research stations, experimental forests, cooperative
reforestation programs, and state administrative counterparts this fostered not only
formed the modern practice of professional forestry in the U.S.,75 it yielded the
institutional, cultural, and knowledge backdrop of the 1970s legislation. Or at least it
seemed like knowledge. Professional forestry’s heyday stemmed in large part from
echelons through its manuals, chains of command, personnel, norms, budget, and characteristic modes of
decision-making. His conclusion was that the Service had managed to sustain a high degree of unity while
avoiding the perils of uniformity or hierarchical rigidity. See id. at 203-31.
71. See MICHAEL FROME, THE FOREST SERVICE (1971); see also A University View of the Forest
Service, S. Doc. 91-115, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
72.

See LEWIS, supra note 53, at 68-73; Clary, supra note 64, at 34-66.

73. The first known Forest Service report on the nation’s timber production, named for Arthur
Capper, the Kansas senator who sponsored the resolution requesting it, was delivered to the Senate in late
1920. HAROLD K. STEEN, THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: A HISTORY 181-83 (1976) (Forest Hist. Soc’y
2004) (describing the Capper Report’s conclusion that serious timber depletion had led to record high
timber prices); but see FROME, supra note 71, at 131 (describing an 1876 payment to a Dr. Franklin Hough
for a report to Congress on the best means to renew forests). By the time “multiple use” first appeared in
agency lingo in the 1930s it was typically meant to contrast with “single use” lands that had been placed
in watershed and “primitive area” protective designations. See HIRT, supra note 52, at 36.
74. Pub. L. No. 70-466, 45 Stat. 699, 699-700 (1928), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-307, 92 Stat. 353
(1978) (FRRRRA). This Act coincided with—and may have been precipitated by—a “substantial
overproduction” of timber and the resultant “downward spiral” in prices that year, a “timber bust” that
did not end until World War II. See CLARY, supra note 64, at 83.
75. See LINCOLN BRAMWELL, FOREST MANAGEMENT FOR ALL: STATE AND PRIVATE
FORESTRY IN THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE (2013); LEWIS, supra note 53, at 72-73, 80-81; DANA &
FAIRFAX, supra note 14, at 114-15, 121-31; STEEN, supra note 73, at 140-44, 187-95. An early retrospective
was to similar effect. See Earle H. Clapp, The Decennial of the McSweeney-McNary Act, 36(9) J. FORESTRY
832 (1938). Congress currently funds seven research stations, eighty-one experimental forests and ranges,
a Joint Fire Science Program, the Forest Inventory and Analysis (FIA) program, and State and Private
Forestry (SPF) grants. See CONG. RSCH. SERV. R46557, supra note 7, at 9-10.
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overestimations of what ecology and economics could reveal.76 And although both
have since foundered in methodological disputes, forestry research funded in whole
or in part by the American taxpayer continues unabated.77 On timber, wood products,
and wildfire, the Service has remained the dominant source of research and research
funding for over a century.78 Yet, by contrast, its contributions to the long-term study
of ecosystem integrity have been minor.
The statutes also reveal a struggle to establish coordination norms in
Congress.79 Coordination problems involve those with shared but not fully
coincident interests.80 The NFS is special in that it most immediately concerns only
a cross-section of the country.81 Commodities and other goods derived from NFS
lands do concern the American public at large.82 Whether for timber, water,
76. See WILLIAM G. ROBBINS, AMERICAN FORESTRY: A HISTORY OF NATIONAL, STATE, AND
PRIVATE COOPERATION (1985). It is no exaggeration to say that the discovery that wood fiber grows
faster in younger than in older trees by itself sparked the applied science of silviculture. Refinements
thereof have continued for centuries. See MICHAEL WILLIAMS, DEFORESTING THE EARTH: FROM
PREHISTORY TO GLOBAL CRISIS 260-62 (2006). But ecologists today fit such facts into the study of intraand inter-specific competition/coexistence. See Ray Dybzinski & David Tilman, Competition and
Coexistence in Plant Communities, in THE PRINCETON GUIDE TO ECOLOGY 186 (Simon A. Levin ed.,
2009).
77. For FY 2011-20, Congress appropriated an average of $295.6 million (constant dollars) to the
Service for “forest and rangeland research” and another $271.8 million on average for state and private
forestry grants. See R46557, supra note 7, at Table 3.
78. See CARLOS RODRIGUEZ-FRANCO, A CENTURY OF WILDLAND FIRE RESEARCH:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LONG-TERM APPROACHES FOR WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 5-11 (2017)
(hereafter “Fire Research”); FROME, supra note 71, at 131-40.
79. Such institutional development in Congress, while surely “path dependent” and influenced by
history, can be catalyzed by disparate forces. See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY,
INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 134-39 (2004). But once an institutional equilibrium arises among
those who still may disagree over a “better” outcome, each member can have strong incentives to maintain
an equilibrium. See id. at 143-66.
80. See DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION 5-8 (Blackwell Publishers 2002) (1969). Legislators with a
common interest in reducing their own uncertainty need not share any other interests. If we further
assume that knowledge and/or policy expertise is costly to acquire but potentially useful to all members
once acquired, one coordination problem Congress may face is in being informationally efficient. See Thomas
W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 531, 536-38 (1990); KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 7376 (1991).
81. The NFS statutes all originated from three House and Senate committees: the House and
Senate committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee.
NFS issues of national concern—budget consequences, commodity production, long-term productivity—
played varying roles in those committees. But by 1970, they had long been home to several senior Western
members. See Hirt, supra note 52, at 193-215.
82. Timber and timber receipts, though no longer as big a driver of local, regional, or national
markets as when the statutes were enacted, remain the paradigmatic example. The economy was and is
vitally affected by lumber, pulp, and fiber prices. Cf. JAMES L. HOWARD & KWAMEKA C. JONES, FPLRP-679, U.S. TIMBER PRODUCTION, TRADE, CONSUMPTION AND PRICE STATISTICS, 1965-2013 at 13
(Feb. 2016) (calculating that total volume of wood products produced in the U.S. had fallen from a high
of 18 billion cubic feet in the 1980s to 13.6 billion cubic feet in 2013 while total primary wood paper

Fall 2021

Composition Over Division: The Statutes of the National Forest System

139

biodiversity, carbon storage, or any other emergent good, the NFS has been and will
be valued and evaluated as a whole.83 Yet then, as now, more than four-fifths of NFS
lands were found in only fifteen states,84 concentrating the interests in NFS land use
spatially and politically.85 This divides those interests that rightly factor into local
optimizing from other interests in more “global” optima across the NFS as a whole
system. The NFS states are a discrete group in Congress. While its senate
delegations have comprised less than a third of their chamber since Alaska’s statehood
in 1959, the House delegations have expanded slightly from about a fifth in 1976 to
about a quarter of that chamber after the most recent reapportionment in 2013.86
This imbalance of interests in NFS land use is important to keep in mind.87
The spread and concentration of costs and benefits over space and time
surely must inform any claim to some unitary Congressional intent within the
statutes.88 But so does the difference between abundant information and scarce
products fell from a high of 220 million tons in 1991 to 140.2 million tons in 2013 with variable decreases
in value); see also STEEN, supra note 73, at 246-323; CLARY, supra note 64, at 195-99.
83. See USDA FOREST SERV., GTR-WO-87, FUTURE OF AMERICA’S FORESTS AND
RANGELANDS: FOREST SERVICE 2010 RESOURCES PLANNING ACT ASSESSMENT 3-9 (2012). Many of
the supporting technical reports behind these synthesis reports are far more granular. For example, by
2011 the NFS supplied only 2% of U.S. wood and paper products. See Sonja Oswalt et al., GTR-WO-91,
FOREST RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES, 2012: A TECHNICAL DOCUMENT SUPPORTING THE
FOREST SERVICE UPDATE OF THE 2010 RPA ASSESSMENT 3 (2014).
84. They are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., LAND AREAS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM 198 (2011).
85. The control of “land use” has been distinguished from environmental quality regulation
repeatedly in the national forest context. See, e.g., Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S.
572, 584-89 (1987) (holding that NFMA did not preempt state statute in part because the former was a
land use planning law and the latter was aimed at “environmental protection”); Bohmker v. Oregon, 903
F.3d 1029, 1038-52 (9th Cir. 2018).
86. The House delegations of those fifteen states stood at eighty-six as of 1973 and, after the
Twenty-third Census reapportionment in 2013, at 108 (both out of 435). This was also a period of rapid
metropolitan expansion throughout the West, bringing acute demands for water and energy. See RICHARD
WHITE, “IT’S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN”: A NEW HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WEST 541-52, 553-58 (1991). Five of these states (Alaska, Wyoming, Montana, and the Dakotas) remain
among the ten smallest by population and three of them (Wyoming, Alaska, and North Dakota) in the
five smallest. All fifteen NFS states except California are overrepresented in the Senate and Electoral
College. Including California, the thirty senators represent an average of 2.72 million people—well below
the national average of 3.28 million. Excluding California, the twenty-eight senators represent less than
half the national average at 1.5 million per senator.
87. I hasten to note that comparatively small NFS units dot landscapes in dozens of other states,
including West Virginia where the notorious Monongahela dispute arose. See Spurr, supra note 26, at 23739. These forests are fundamentally different in scale and proportion from those of the fifteen NFS states,
however. See CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON & DAVID GOVATSKI, FORESTS FOR THE PEOPLE: THE STORY
OF AMERICA’S EASTERN NATIONAL FORESTS 316-19 (2013).
88. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 283-95 (1988) (contrasting politically concentrated from
politically diffuse interests and their relative influence in forming and maintaining legislating coalitions).
Thus, although a “general interest” in the NFS lands outside our fifteen NFS states may well be more

140

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 11:1

knowledge. Three Congressional committees—subsets and delegates of their
chambers89—were central in the framing and enactment of the statutes.90 These
committees collected testimony, data, and supposedly expertise.91 But with major
legislative reorganizations in 1971 and 1974,92 committee dynamics evolved quickly
over the formative period, as did the Congress’s interests in budgeting and deficits.93
That divergence—or at least differentiation—of interests in NFS optimization can
also shed light on the twin dilemmas and on Congress’s response. Part II describes
the architecture that resulted with an emphasis on how today’s Congress is positioned
as a result.

II. THE MODAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE NFS STATUTES:
CONSTRAINING AN OPTIMIZATION
The 1970s congresses were preoccupied with budget deficits, unaccountable
spending, and White House responsibility for both.94 Budgeting based on economic
forecasting and not ad hoc conflict resolution became, for a critical period in the 1970s,

attenuated or more diffuse than those interests prevalent nearby them, it is quite incorrect to say that no
general interests exist or existed in the 1970s. But see DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 14, at 232.
89. Congressional committees are among the most well-studied phenomena in politics. See
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS IN
THE MODERN HOUSE 3-7 (1978). Committee assignments have long been a key form of internal
organization. And the most prevalent theory of Congress—that members serve their own interests and
deal transactionally with each other—gives little quarter to Congress acting on its institutional interests. In
this familiar light, committees reflect members’ relative bargaining power. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle
& Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV., 90 (1987).
Yet gains from any trade can be difficult to capture amid uncertainty, leading some to argue that such
“distributive” theories take insufficient account of members’ strategic responses to their own ignorance
and the fact that policy expertise can be useful to all in the legislative process. See, e.g., Gilligan & Krehbiel,
supra note 80; DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 10-11 (1999).
90. In the Senate, the Agriculture and Forestry and the Interior and Insular Affairs committees
both played active roles in gathering evidence and framing the principal bills as did the Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry in the House. See BUSINESS MEETINGS ON NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT
ACT OF 1976, COMM. ON AGRICULTURE (94th Cong., 2d Sess.) (Dec. 1976); REPORT OF THE COMM.
ON AGRIC. AND FORESTRY TO ACCOMPANY S. 3091 (94th Cong., 2d Sess.) (May 1976); AN ANALYSIS
OF FORESTRY ISSUES IN THE FIRST SESSION OF THE 92D CONGRESS, COMM. ON INTERIOR AND
INSULAR AFFS. (92d Cong., 2d Sess.) (1972).
91. Members’ investments in their own committee duties will trade off of their efforts to other
ends. This may mean a divergence of committees’ and their parent chambers’ distributive goals. See
Gilligan & Krehbiel, supra note 80, at 532.
92. See SHEPSLE, supra note 89, at 262-81. Anecdotal evidence suggests that institutional changes
in Congress almost always reflect multiple overlapping interests supporting them. See SCHICKLER, supra
note 20, at 249-69.
93.

See SHEPSLE, supra note 89, at 242; SHICKLER, supra note 20, at 195.

94. See Lance T. LeLoup, Process Versus Policy: the U.S. House Budget Committee, 4(2) LEGIS. STUD.
Q. 227, 247-49 (1979); SCHICKLER, supra note 20, at 190-93.
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a bipartisan agenda.95 The NFS statutes were an outgrowth of that and, as a whole,
prescribe a structured “Program” deliberately uniting all aspects of the NFS—
appropriations, management, protection, study—to maximize its net value over the
long term.96 The forests’ commodities and familiar reforestation techniques invited
such optimizing.97 Congress clearly signaled that it (not the President) was to be the
principal.98 The Program was to be built from inventory assessment,99 enhanced

95. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297 (1974), entrenched a fixed and coordinated budget process and a Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) to pair revenue with spending decisions. See SCHICKLER, supra note 20, at 195-200. Designed to
“strengthen congressional control over the size and shape of the federal budget,” Louis Fisher,
Congressional Budget Reform: The First Two Years, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 413, 413 (1977), this Congressional
Budget Act restructured an ad hoc process authorizing federal spending, id. at 416-18, principally as a
means of limiting deficit spending and increasing Congress’s control over all spending, id. at 418-21.
96. See FRRRPA § 3 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1602) (setting out itemized elements of
the “Renewable Resource Program” including an analysis of present and anticipated uses, demand for, and
supply of the renewable resources of the NFS, an inventory of present and potential renewable resources,
a description of Forest Service research and cooperative programming on the NFS, and a “discussion of
important policy considerations” expected to influence use and management of NFS lands, and declaring
that the Program was to “cover each of the four fiscal decades next following”); see also NFMA § 6(e)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)) (requiring Secretary to “assure” that land and resource
management plans “provide for multiple use and sustained yield” “in accordance” with MUSYA which,
in turn, requires “achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic
output of the various renewable resources” “without impairment of the productivity of the land”).
97. Compare NFMA § 2(7) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1600(7)) (“[T]he Forest Service
should expand its research in the use of recycled and waste timber product materials, develop techniques
for the substitution of these secondary materials for primary materials, and promote and encourage the
use of recycled timber product materials”) with FRRRRA § 2(a)(7) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
1641(a)(7)) (“Better and more frequent forest inventorying and analysis is necessary to identify
productivity-related forestry research needs and to provide forest managers with the current data necessary
to make timely and effective management decisions.”).
98. FRRRPA § 7(a) prescribed in detail presidential actions subject to one-house legislative vetoes
which became unenforceable in the wake of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Much more lasting were
FRRRPA and NFMA’s prescriptions for NFS budgeting and the process by which appropriations would
be made. See Fisher, supra note 95, at 414-18; cf. LE MASTER, supra note 17, at 48-49 (noting FRRRPA’s
close affiliation with the Budget Impoundment and Control Act and concluding that FRRRPA was
“conceived in Congress” and was not an “administration bill” like MUSYA); HIRT, supra note 52, at 25960 (arguing that FRRRPA reflected Congress’s need “to find a course of action that would minimize
dissatisfaction,” that “provided interest groups more access to Forest Service decision making,” and that
it reflected the “political feasibility” at the time). The required annual reports on each of the “component
elements of the Program” to be submitted in tandem with the Administration’s annual budget proposal
were the levers of fiscal control. FRRRPA § 7(c) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1605(c)). This had
the practical effect of shifting power to the then-new Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and, thus,
Congress’s oversight of the Program. See Lance T. LeLoup, Discretion in National Budgeting: Controlling the
Controllables, 4(4) POL’Y ANALYSIS 455, 474 (1978). Finally, the CBO’s alignment of NFS spending with
budget committees in both chambers, see Fisher, supra note 95, at 430-31, 435-40, further polarized an
already contentious process while reducing the subject matter committees’ power, see id. at 435-40; LE
MASTER, supra note 17, at 144-56.
99. See FRRRPA § 4 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1603) (requiring a “comprehensive and
appropriately detailed inventory of all [NFS] lands and renewable resources”).
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research,100 national planning,101 and unit-level planning with local stakeholders,102
and was to employ a “systematic, interdisciplinary approach” to the foregoing
intended to “achieve integrated consideration of physical, biological, economics, and
other sciences.”103 This echoed a then-new “policy statement” in the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).104 As Part II explains, Congress’s constraints on
this Program were ordered quite subtly and not as the divisionary interpreters have
had it.
A. Paper Restraints? Choices of Modality in the NFS Statutes
The NFS Program was to “be developed in accordance with principles set
forth” in NEPA and MUSYA,105 “principles” that, then as now, were uncertain at
best.106 Optimization, however, was self-evidently the goal.107 Even the Service’s field
100. See FRRRPA § 2(3) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1601(3)) (requiring a decadal
assessment that “shall include but not be limited to . . . a description of Forest Service programs and
responsibilities in research, cooperative programs and management of the [NFS]”).
101. See FRRRPA § 3 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1602) (requiring “Program” to be
delivered to the President to “cover” “at least each of the four fiscal decades next following” the first
“period” of October 1976 to October 1980).
102. See FRRRPA § 5(a) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a)). FRRRPA included the first
statutory requirement that the Service create unit-level “land and resource management plans” (LRMPs),
a requirement that has become central to its legacy.
103. See FRRRPA § 5(b) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b)).
104. NEPA declared a “national policy” of using “all practicable means and measures . . . in a
manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.” Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 101(a), 83 Stat. 852,
852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)). It also directed that all federal agencies “shall
utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and
social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an
impact on man’s environment.” Id. at § 102(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A)).
105. See FRRRPA § 3 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1602).
106. MUSYA applied only to the national forests yet was regarded as vague and standardless
virtually from its inception. See, e.g., J. Michael McCloskey, Note and Comment, The Multiple UseSustained Yield Act of 1960, 41 OR. L. REV. 49, 73-77 (1961). NEPA’s declaration of national policy, by
contrast, was much broader yet was left to a succession of presidential administrations that relegated it to
subordinate status. See Jamison E. Colburn, Administering the National Environmental Policy Act, 45 ENV’T
L. REP. 10287 (2015).
107. To optimize for multiple goals is to choose only those alternatives that are at least as maximizing
of each as any other available alternative. See AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL
WELFARE xxix (2d ed. 2017). The pursuit of multiple goals, though, can entail trade-offs unless every goal
is perfectly complementary with the other(s). Cf. id. at 454-566 (“We can diagnose a failure of reasoned
decision-making if we choose to reject an identifiably better alternatives, but that problem does not arise
if there is no such option . . . .”). For all that Congress has legislated, the NFS is to be put to multiple,
non-complementary uses maximally. See supra notes 14-46 and accompanying text. For example, of the
two “[r]equired assurances” Congress ordered from the Secretary, one is that s/he “shall assure” that unitlevel plans “provide for multiple use and sustained yield of the products and services” obtained from the
NFS “in accordance with [MUSYA].” NFMA § 6 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1) (2012)).
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offices were to be “so situated as to provide the optimum level of convenient, useful
services to the public.”108 The active questions all went to the degree to which the
optimizing would be constrained.109 It was common knowledge that the knowledge
needed to do such optimizing with any confidence was lacking.110 In 1970, the
PLLRC had put research among the keys to more optimal use of the public lands.111
The 1978 FRRRRA further underscored the role Forest Service research was to
play.112 The Service’s leadership maintained that all the statutes’ restraints were
administrative, flexible, and consonant with existing practice.113 And, indeed, the
NFS statutes enlisted the Service to create its own constraints without specifying
any decision procedure more specific than plan-act-adapt.114
It is unsound, however, to ignore the statutes’ specific terminology and
structure. Congress required the Service to promulgate “regulations” setting forth

And for its part, ever since what has been called forestry’s “golden era” of 1898-1910, the Service has
espoused an essentially utilitarian ordering of priorities. See DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 14, at 72.
108. See FRRRPA § 10(b) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1609(b)).
109. Statutory “constraints” here can take several forms. The modality by which delegative statutes
operate—permitting, prohibiting, or requiring—affect horizontal relations among Congress, President, and
judiciary, as well as vertical relations within our federalism. Modal variations can be subtle, though. For
example, Congress’s declared “policy” that “appropriate forest cover” mark the NFS’s “forested lands,”
begs the question of a “policy” establishment of this kind and its practical difference. Experience with
NEPA’s declaration of national policy before the bulk of the NFS statutes were enacted had not yet
relegated NEPA to ‘mere’ procedure. See Sam Kalen, The Devolution of NEPA: How the APA Transformed
the Nation’s Environmental Policy, 33 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 483 (2009).
110. See, e.g., MARION CLAWSON, THE ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 3437 (1976) (calling essential but missing knowledge of input-to-output ratios for different uses, the degree
to which uses trade off one another, shadow prices for goods and service not traded in markets and standing
timber’s capitalization value(s)); FROME, supra note 71, at 138-40 (noting how little the Service’s “basic
research” into timber and timber production had resolved in decades of work).
111. See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND, supra note 39, at 80-81; cf. Behan, supra note 37, at
310-21, 336-41 (arguing that the Service’s “sustained yield” policies of the 1970s were incoherent because
repeating maximum annual tree growth indefinitely had not yet been achieved in practice).
112. FRRRRA § 2 originally declared both that it “shall be deemed to complement the policies and
direction set forth in” FRRRPA and that Congress had found “that scientific discoveries and technological
advances must be made and applied to support the protection, management, and utilization of the Nation’s
renewable resources.” FRRRRA § 2(a)-(b) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1641(a)-(b)).
113. See CI-16, supra note 60; cf. Cliff, supra note 26, at 514-19 (comparing the Service’s standard
operating procedures to what would following under the NFS statutes).
114. See, e.g., NFMA § 6(g)(1) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1)) (requiring Service to “specify[]
procedures”); id. at § 6(k) (requiring Secretary to “review” any decision to identify lands as “not suited
for timber production” “at least every 10 years”). The NFS statutes put long- and short-term reporting
duties on the Service independent of its resource planning. But resource planning was to progress in
sequence from inventorying to optimizing through actions like “permits, contracts, and other instruments
for the use and occupancy” of NFS lands. NFMA § 6(i) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i)) (requiring
resource plans, permits, contracts and other instruments to be “consistent” with LRMPs); see also id. at §
1604(f)(3) (requiring an “interdisciplinary team” to prepare unit-level plans “based on inventories of the
applicable resources of the forest”); Robert Brazeale, Is Something Wrong with the National Forest
Management Act?, 21 J. LAND, RES., & ENV’T L. 329 (2001).
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“standards” and “guidelines” for “plans” for land uses and actions pursuing the plans,
while addressing the different information demands of the foregoing.115 It required
that these “guidelines” either “provide for” or “insure” the achievement of its listed
objectives.116 And while the process for creating land use plans was carefully ordered
by Congress,117 the references to timber and timber production were couched in the
Service’s professional jargon—hardly a way to bind it to paths unknown.118 Congress’
modal differentiations could not have been accidental.119 The actual structure—
“regulations” with “guidelines” for the creation of “plans” ordering specific actions—
has often been oversimplified.120 In at least one case, it has been ignored.121 But the

115. See NFMA § 6(f)-(j) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)-(j)).
116. NFMA subsections 6(g)(1)-(3) fill out what the “guidelines” shall include and in only one
instance do they “require the identification of the suitability of lands for resource management.” Id. at §
6(g)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Because this is all that Congress required be a requirement, it stands apart
from the other sixteen. Nonetheless, the significance of the imperative operator for this one purpose may
be diminished by its substance: the Service need only require that land’s suitability for resource
management be identified ex ante.
117. NFMA § 6(d) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604); cf. Mark D. Squillace, Rethinking Public Land
Use Planning, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 415, 426 (2019) (noting that the statutes detail a “robust public
participation process”). Because the APA’s rulemaking provision has always exempted matters “relating
to . . . public property,” see 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2), Congress explicitly required that these regulations be
adopted “in accordance with the procedures set forth in” 5 U.S.C. § 553, see 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g). This is
the only mandate of its kind in the NFS statutes.
118. See Cheever, supra note 59, at 644-56 (describing the origin of “culmination of mean annual
increment (CMAI),” rotation restocking standards, even-aged management, etc.).
119. NFMA § 11, adding a section 15 to FRRRPA, directed that the Secretary “shall prescribe such
regulations as he determines necessary and desirable to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.” 16
U.S.C. § 1613. Supreme Court precedent at the time distinguished quite noticeably between “regulations”
populating the Code of Federal Regulations and the vast range of agency guidance, guidelines, interpretive
rules, etc., that did not rise to that level of force or permanence. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 141 (1976); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 306 (1979).
120. See, e.g., Lamb v. Thompson, 265 F.3d 1038, 1042 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing NFS statutes
as establishing a “two-step process for forest planning”); Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); Inland Empire Pub. Lands Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
88 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); but cf. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341
F.3d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 2003) (observing that the Forest Service “utilizes a three-tiered approach to forest
management” as prescribed by the NFS statutes).
121. In Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., the court held that the 1971 Church Guidelines
somehow bound the Service through NFMA, erroneously citing one case, California v. Block, 690 F.2d
753 (9th Cir. 1982), claiming it had “recognize[d] the binding authority of the Church guidelines,” Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 592 F. Supp. 931, 937 (D. Or. 1984) (it did not), and another claiming
that it had held “that Congress had explicitly intended to permit clearcutting on federal land as long as
the [Service] complied with the Church Guidelines.” Id. (citing Tex. Comm. on Nat. Res. v. Bergland,
573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978)). Bergland predated the Service’s original regulations and held that whatever
force the Church Guidelines might have was not for judicial resolution without Service regulations and
plans to construe. See 573 F.2d at 210-12. National Wildlife Federation has never been followed by any court.
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different facets are meaningfully distinguishable as a matter of law and readily
recognized in the modal force our courts have ascribed to various agency outputs.122
The “regulations” were to be reviewed by “a committee of scientists who
are not officers or employees of the Forest Service” and who were to “provide
scientific and technical advice and counsel . . . [and] assure that an effective
interdisciplinary approach is proposed and adopted.”123 No fewer than seventeen
objectives were to be pursued through those regulations, though.124 There were no
scientists then, nor are there many today, who specialized in reducing biological (or
ecological) uncertainties in the present so as to protect a mix of benefits to be had
from the environment of the future.125 Any such “program” will therefore struggle to
settle its prescribed land uses. From this Program’s outset, that has been the core
dilemma.126 And Congress put it to the Service in unmistakably mandatory terms:
122. This was as true then as it is today. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
449 U.S. 232, 236 (1980); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04 (1979); Batterton v. Francis,
432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977); 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 54-60 (2d ed.
1979). This is not to say that courts have always appreciated this architecture. For example, a court that
maintains that “NFMA requires that forest plans ‘provide for diversity of plant and animal communities
based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area,’” Ecology Ctr. v. Castaneda, 574 F.3d 652,
656 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B)), mistakes the statute’s requirement that the
guidelines within the § 6(g) “regulations” should do so. Though perhaps subtle, the mistake should be
obvious when, in the very same opinion, that court rejects a claim that the Service had failed to follow its
own plan by holding that the part of the plan in question, embodied in “merely advisory or aspirational”
guidelines, could not be violated per se. See id. at 660-61.
123. NFMA § 6(h)(1) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1)). This “committee of
scientists” (COS) has been convened twice, once for the original 1979 regulations—reconvening briefly
for the 1982 amendments—and once for the ill-fated 2000 revisions. See Charles F. Wilkinson, A Case
Study in the Intersection of Law and Science: The 1999 Report of the Committee of Scientists, 42 ARIZ. L. REV.
307, 307-09 (2000). In the 2012 rulemaking, the Obama Administration appointed a broader committee
of stakeholders pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, ignoring § 6(h)(1). See Susan Jane M.
Brown & Martin Nie, Making Forest Planning Great Again? Early Implementation of the Forest Service’s 2012
National Forest Planning Rule, 33(3) NAT. RES. & ENV’T 1, 1 (Winter 2019).
124. NFMA § 6(g)(1)-(3) as amended includes seventeen itemized elements in the “regulations”
that the Service “shall include, but not be limited to.” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). An A.L.R. annotation
inventoried almost three dozen published opinions from courts of appeal construing Section 6(g) as of
2020. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and Application of 16 U.S.C.A. 1604(g) and
Implementing Regulations Calling for Environmental Consideration, Resource, and Land Management Guidelines
for Forest System Land and Resource Management Plans for Units of the National Forest System, 5 A.L.R. Fed.
3d Art. 7 (2015) (current as of November 2020).
125. For example, from among twenty-five “tasks” the Service found within NFMA, itemized and
paired to specified “actions,” see CI-16, supra note 60, at 6-16, the Service summarized the statute as having
equipped the agency “with the tools needed to practice scientific forest management,” id. at 20. Yet not
one of its tasks or actions pertained to new scientific expertise to be developed or acquired.
126. President Ford’s “Statement of Policy” for the Program, delivered to Congress as required by
FRRRPA § 7(a) in March 1976, stated that its preparation was “an extremely difficult task,” complicated
by “a lack of adequate and accurate data on program input/output relationships,” troubles “determining
the relative priority of competing uses,” and uncertainty over both rates of future growth and “demand
and supply relationships for each competing use.” Statement of Policy under the Forest and Rangeland
Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, 1 PUB. PAPERS 503, 504 (Mar. 2, 1976).

146

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 11:1

the regulations “shall” “insure research on and (based on continuous monitoring and
assessment in the field) evaluation of the effects of each management system to the
end that it will not produce substantial and permanent impairment of the
productivity of the land.”127

B. Maximizing “Productivity”: Audited Self-Regulation
Timber production had, until recently, receded from national attention.
Except for Alaska’s Tongass, timber production is rarely the biggest issue in a
national forest.128 All timber production from federal lands sank to historic lows in
the 1990s and has remained there for decades.129 Nontimber forest products (NTFPs)
are the NFS’s emergent commodities of today,130 along with woody biomass for
energy recovery.131 Augmented timber production is only a matter of time, though.132
The budget consequences have been and could again be dramatic.133 States’ shares in
federal timber receipts, though long significant,134 have dwindled.135 Reforestation,
long thought to be the key to sustaining timber production, has since come under
searching scrutiny for its cost and its role in wildfire management.136 Thus, although
the system seems poised for an upturn in timber output, it will confront considerable
frictions if it does.

127. NFMA § 6(g)(3)(C) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(C)).
128. See Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Releases Plan to Open Tongass Forest to Logging, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/climate/tongass-logging.html.
129. See ANNE A. RIDDLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45688, TIMBER HARVESTING ON FEDERAL
LANDS 8 (2021).
130. See USDA FOREST SERV., GTR-SRS-232, ASSESSMENT OF NONTIMBER FOREST
PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER CHANGING CONDITIONS 121-46 (2018) (finding that
several NTFPs have annual sales figures in the hundreds of millions of dollars but that no reliable data
exist for the vast majority of NTFPs).
131. See Dale et al., supra note 56, at 144-46; Birdsey et al., supra note 56, at 1-2.
132. New technologies may spur new and different demands in the coming decade. See infra note
311 and accompanying text.
133. The Service estimates that urban areas increased by 45% between 1990 and 2010. See USDA
FOREST SERV., GTR-WO-94, FUTURE OF AMERICA’S FORESTS AND RANGELANDS: UPDATE TO THE
FOREST SERVICE 2010 RESOURCES PLANNING ACT ASSESSMENT 2-1 (2016). But the RPA reports since
2010 have noted higher-than-average increases in areas adjacent to national parks, national forests, and
wilderness areas. Id. at 2-2. State and local revenue sources, thus, shift significantly from such land use
changes.
134. See Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing
16 U.S.C. § 500) (observing that “[f]rom 1970 through 2001, Alaska received more than $93 million in
Tongass receipts,” making Alaska “directly affected” by Tongass timber production).
135. See CONG. RSCH. SERV. R45688, supra note 129, at 8, 13-14. As timber sales have waned,
states have opted for alternative payments from the federal government. Id.
136. See Malcolm P. North et al., Tamm Review: Reforestation for Resilience in Dry Western U.S.
Forests, 432 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 209 (2019).
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By far, the most noted (and contested) Congressional objective besides
timber was that the guidelines for plan development “provide for diversity of plant
and animal communities based on the suitability and capability of the specific land
area in order to meet overall multiple-use objectives.”137 This language does anything
but prioritize plant and animal communities above the timber objective.138 It requires
that the guidelines within the regulations provide for (i.e., foster, enable, support)
diverse plant and animal “communities.”139 To be sure, practical necessities might
demand subordinating timber (or other objectives) if community diversity is to be
protected.140 But the bare text does not. On its face, the text qualifies the objective
(“diversity” of “communities”) with a spatially drawn proviso: local land
“capability.”141 We might even think of this as a constrained constraint in the
constrained optimization!142

137. Tuholske and Brennan dubbed this the “diversity requirement,” see Tuholske & Brennan, supra
note 59, at 77, arguing that it provided courts the legal basis necessary to review and set aside Forest
Service actions alleged to be insufficiently protective of wildlife, see id. at 73 (discussing Seattle Audubon
Soc’y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992)). Weiss likewise dubbed it the “diversity
mandate” and emphasized it above all other “substantive” standards in the statutes. See Weiss, supra note
59, at 647-50. The first Committee of Scientists declared that this provision was the most perplexing of
all. See National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,554, 26,698
(proposed May 4, 1979) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
138. The provision continues that the Secretary also “provide, where appropriate, and to the degree
practicable, for steps to be taken to preserve the diversity of tree species similar to that existing in the
region controlled” by an LRMP. NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B). Contrast this duty, such as it is, to
Leopold’s land ethic: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC
AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 224-25 (1949).
139. Congress could have simply required the Service to achieve or to insure diversity of plant and
animal communities, for example. Likewise, Congress put a considerable burden of production on the
Service in its use of even-aged timber harvests. See NFMA § 6(g)(3)(F) (directing Service to “specify[]
guidelines which” “insure that clearcutting . . . and other cuts designed to regenerate an even-aged stand
of timber will only be used as a cutting method” after a determination that it is the “optimum method,”
after an interdisciplinary review, and where three other provisos are met).
140. This is precisely the contention in most legal challenges to Forest Service actions grounded in
§ 6(g)(3)(B). See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. But, as the first Committee of Scientists
acknowledged in studying the provision and its drafting history, its “[t]ranslation” into requirements for
planners in the regulation was a “formidable task.” See 88 Fed. Reg. at 26,609.
141. Wilkinson and Anderson noted that the provision had been “born out of a patchwork” of bills
that the “drafters cut and spliced until they achieved a suitable compromise.” WILKINSON & ANDERSON,
supra note 60, at 291. The net result, they concluded, was of “broad significance” to the NFS, but that it
was “difficult to discern any concrete legal standards” therefrom. Id. at 296.
142. As mentioned, constraints in any optimization can be both “hard,” i.e., firm conditions, and
“soft,” i.e., penalties. NFMA § 6(g)(3)(B) expressly conditions upon local circumstances its directive that
the Service provide for community diversity, embedding the assumption that (I) some local conditions
may be incompatible with the objective; (II) other obligations may be less than complementary to the
objective; or (III) both (I) and (II) may be true. But it also arguably enables the “penalizing” of the Service
through litigation challenging its actions for their fit with the provision. See William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 879 (1975).
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Experience with this provision in context has revealed Congress’s plan in
its several dimensions.143 The science of how one might even conceivably provide for
the “diversity” of biota and biotic communities amidst commodity extraction in
perpetuity, to say nothing of their optimization in perpetuity, was unformed then and
remains controversial today.144 Congress’s legislated findings hint at the complexity
of the mission being assigned. Knowledge in place of views or arguments was key145
no doubt because, with multiple tasks come multiple paths by which an agent can
fail—or be perceived to have failed.146 Community ecology is and has long been an
epistemic and methodological minefield.147 Professional ecologists still fight wars
over their most basic axioms.148 Indeed, in hindsight, it seems that Congress’s
reluctance to demand community protection amidst commodity production may
have had a deeper foundation than earlier interpreters allowed.149
143. See infra notes 138-68 and accompanying text.
144. Strikingly, the original Committee of Scientists settled on its viable populations approach
reportedly from a dictionary definition of “diversity” (“variety”) and without any attention to the
provision’s other term—community. See National Forest System Land and Resource Management
Planning, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,609. Keiter, National Network, supra note 49, at 91-93 (observing that “ecologybased” land management would entail many more active protections for imperiled species than have been
implemented, including “assisted translocation” and combining management areas into continentally
scaled multi-unit networks to reflect what conservation biologists now prescribe).
145. In 1976, Congress found that to “serve the national interest” the renewable resource program
must be “based on a comprehensive assessment” of present and future demands and the impacts thereof.
See NFMA § 2(3). In 1978, after the first such assessment had been prepared and submitted to Congress,
Congress found that “scientific discoveries and technological advances must be made and applied” if the
Nation’s renewable resources were to be optimally utilized, managed, and protected. FRRRRA § 2(a)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1641(a)).
146. Agents tasked with more than one goal can present optimization problems to their principals.
See Avinash Dixit, Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review, 37(4) J. HUM.
RES. 696, 704 (2002) (“The effects of interaction among multiple actions and outcomes on the power of
incentives depends on whether the actions are substitutes or complements in the agent’s cost function.”).
Observability is often a major factor in such relationships where the principal values the goals differently.
Id. at 706-07.
147. Ecologists party to the great null hypothesis debate that attended the rise of island
biogeography left a long record of these battles. See James F. Quinn & Arthur E. Dunham, On Hypothesis
Testing in Ecology and Evolution, 122 AM. NATURALIST 602, 602 (1983) (noting that explicit hypothesis
testing had become a major divide within the field and that the “intellectual basis for this discussion”
traced to Bacon’s Novum Organum); Lawton, supra note 47, at 188 (arguing that laws and rules of ecology
are inherently contingent).
148. Compare Edward F. Connor et al., The Checkered History of Checkerboard Distributions, 94(11)
ECOLOGY 2403, 2413 (2013) (describing their study as “the latest installment in a controversy [over
interspecific competition as cause of biogeographic variation] that has lasted more than 30 years”), with
Jared M. Diamond & Michael E. Gilpin, Examination of the “Null” Model of Connor and Simberloff for Species
Co-occurrences on Islands, 52 OECOLOGIA 64, 73 (1982) (arguing that “a little reflection shows how
unwarranted is the dogmatic assertion” by Connor, Simberloff, and others that all researchers of
biogeographic variation on islands as some function of interspecific competition must employ strict
hypothesis testing methods).
149. Introductory ecology texts today all acknowledge the contingency of scientific claims about
community structure. See RICK RELYEA & ROBERT RICKLEFS, ECOLOGY: THE ECONOMY OF NATURE
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Facing the dilemmas it was, Congress adopted a distinctive solution: audited
self-regulation.150 Because Congress itself could not specify the appropriate
constraints—nor even conduct a good compliance audit—without acquiring and
trusting in a considerable degree of expertise, and because those constraints would,
in any event, have to be adapted if they were to keep pace with scientific advances,
it called on its agent to do so subject to Congress’s imperfect151 but continuing
oversight.152 This solution, though misunderstood in the years since, explains the
statutes’ compound structure and myriad deliverables.153 It is reinforced by the
Congress’s findings prefacing the statutes.154 In places, Wilkinson and others paid
413 (8th ed. 2018); CHARLES J. KREBS, ECOLOGY: THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION
AND ABUNDANCE 436 (6th Pearson New Int’l Ed. 2014); Michel Loreau, Communities and Ecosystems, in
THE PRINCETON GUIDE TO ECOLOGY 253, 254 (Simon A. Levin ed., 2009). Still, Congress found that
“to serve the national interest,” the Forest Service had to assess and plan for “present and anticipated uses,
demand for, and supply of renewable resources. . . .” NFMA § 2(3) (emphasis added). This finding, like
the first declaring that “the uses, demand for, and supply of the various resources are subject to change
over time,” id. at § 1600(1), made unmistakable Congress’s expectation of changing demand, supply, and
inventories.
150. Audited self-regulation—putting the regulated party under a duty to create and adhere to its
own conduct norms subject to ex post review—has shown that it may resolve a variety of challenges,
including information asymmetries, administrative costs from inflexibility, fairness to the regulated, etc.
See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the
Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006); Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited SelfRegulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (1995).
151. Congress’s limited oversight capacities have long been thought to compromise its control over
delegates. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew C. Stephenson, Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect
Oversight, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 605 (2007) (describing challenges Congress faces in delegating
authority). Of course, Congress may enlist the judiciary as overseer. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al.,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D.
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
152. The decadal RPA assessments were the long-term products Congress demanded. RPA reports
at decadal intervals were almost immediately deemed insufficient, however, and supplemented on an interinterval basis. See ROBBINS, supra note 76, at 258. As of this writing, the 2020 assessment is not yet final
but five past assessments (1975, 1979, 1989, 2000, 2010), four five-year updates (1984, 1993, 2007, 2017),
and dozens of supporting documents for 2020 exist. See U.S. Forest Service, Previous Assessments,
https://www.fs.fed.us/research/rpa/previous/.
153. Then, as now, the variety of agency outputs that prescribe or interpret law or policy leave
“regulations” in their own category. Compare Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—Interpretative,
Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 919 (1948) (“Administrative agencies make rules which if
valid have the full force of law, they issue interpretative rules having varying degrees of authoritative
weight, they publish many kinds of announcements and releases and opinions and rulings whose legal
effect is frequently unclear; and they establish and follow practices and usages which in some practical
respects are almost the equivalent of rules.”), with Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking
Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 828 (2001) (“Statutes, if
valid, are indisputable . . . . Regulations adopted following statutorily commanded procedures are treated
in just the same way.”).
154. Seven declarations denominated as “findings” and codified with the statutes entrench the
predicate facts against which the statutes should be understood. See NFMA § 2 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
1600(1)-(7)). Each declaration—from the first asserting that “management of the Nation’s renewable
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too little heed to Congress’s careful use throughout of terms like “standards,”
“guidelines,” “policy,” and “plans” that were to be incorporated or reflected in a
regulation.155 Most importantly, they keyed on the Service’s discretion to the exclusion
of its performance.156 They paid little attention to the congressional committees’ quick
follow-up with the Service’s preparation and use of Program research,157 to the
collection of RPA data that resulted,158 to the frequent wilderness and other placebased designations excluding multiple use,159 and to important parallels with
FLPMA.160 And, of course, they could scarcely have anticipated the emergence of
wildfire as the NFS’s principal timber-related challenge.

resources is highly complex,” id. at § 1600(1), to the last stating that “recycled timber product materials
are as much a part of our renewable forest resources as are the trees from which they originally came,” id.
at § 1600(7)—is as much a statement of purpose as of fact. Though not abnormal, this can shift the practical
effect of such a declaration. Cf. Daniel A. Crane, Enacted Legislative Findings and the Deference Problem, 102
GEO. L.J. 637, 657-58 (2014) (arguing that merely because a Congressional finding “may not be
scientifically falsifiable does not deprive it of an essentially factual character”).
155. Cf. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 296 (arguing that “when the section is read
in light of the historical context and overall purposes of the NFMA, as well as the legislative history of
the section, it is evident that section 6(g)(3)(B) requires Forest Service planners to treat the wildlife
resource as a controlling, co-equal factor in forest management and, in particular, as a substantive
limitation on timber production”).
156. See, e.g., LE MASTER, supra note 17, at 58-63; WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 60, at
69-90. The elements of this consensus began from the “clear cutting controversies” of the mid-1970s but
by no means ended there. As Federico Cheever argued, the Service’s regulations implementing the timber
production objectives generally kept substantial advantages in any challenges to the Service. See Cheever,
supra note 59, at 644-91; see also FLOURNOY ET AL., supra note 60, at 3-15. Tuholske and Brennan, whose
article advanced the broadest claims of mandatory contents in the statutes, argued that “[m]any
participants in the legislative process believed that NFMA imposed unprecedented limitations on forestry
practices.” Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 59, at 67. Neither the truth nor the relevance of this claim is
obvious, though. When they wrote in 1994, only one appellate court had treated the diversity provision
to which so much of their work was aimed and that was only to hold that it “applied” regardless of
endangered species involvement. See id. at 70 (discussing Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297,
301-02 (9th Cir. 1991)). Scores of precedents have accumulated since. See infra notes 210-15 and
accompanying text.
157. But see LE MASTER, supra note 17, at 138-41 (recounting the 94th Congress’s hearings on the
1975 RRA and push to prepare the 1979 RRA).
158. See supra note 152.
159. See, e.g., CONG. RSCH. SERV. R41649, supra note 41. Congress also routinely enacts areaspecific provisions in omnibus legislative packages, once known as “Hatfield Riders,” in response to
localized conflicts and congressional delegations’ preferences. See MARTIN NIE, THE GOVERNANCE OF
WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS: MAPPING ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE 184-88, 184 n.95 (2008). “The use of
riders to make policy decisions both facilitates and subverts the democratic process. . . . [T]he winning
side refers to them as “amendments,” and the losing side calls them “sneaky rider” provisions.” Id. at 187.
Such riders may exceed the bounds of legislative authority if they interfere with judicial (including
consent) decrees. See Biodiversity Assocs. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2004).
160. FLPMA also pairs a national “policy” to several subtle modal variations while setting a flat
prohibition on “permanent impairment” of the “productivity” of its lands; re-asserts a multiple use
mandate first given in 1964 through Pub. L. No. 88-607; also levies a unit-level planning requirement for
lands that were (and are) of overwhelming importance in only a small minority of states; and resulted

Fall 2021

Composition Over Division: The Statutes of the National Forest System

151

Reviewing courts, in contrast, have been alert to the statutes’ modal
subtleties.161 Take, for example, the requirement that the Service’s action-level
choices “shall be consistent” with the applicable plan.162 The statutes hedge even this
requirement, allowing plans to be “amended in any manner whatsoever.”163 Law that
may be amended in any manner whatsoever is a curious type of law. That has left
reviewing courts to weigh just how “binding” these plans really are or should be.164
Congress required that “significant” amendments be afforded the same process as full
revisions,165 but this merely shifted the focus to the significance of any given
amendment(s).166 Such as they are, the constraints on timber production, long the
from a conference committee’s extemporaneous assembly of different bills. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1724
(1974) (Conf. Rep.).
161. Federico Cheever’s patient study of the statutes’ timber production provisions in court
indirectly confirmed the point. Concerted efforts to challenge the Service’s application of what he called
“substantive timber management provisions” mostly ended in refusals of judicial relief. See Cheever, supra
note 59, at 656-91. Even after sustained critique of the Service’s timber sales for losses, see O’TOOLE,
supra note 18, 299-301, the judicial response was minimal, see, e.g., Rocky Mountain Wild. v. Vilsack, 843
F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198-1200 (D. Colo. 2012); Curry v. U.S. Forest Serv., 988 F. Supp. 541, 554-56 (W.D.
Pa. 1997); Ayers v. Espy, 873 F. Supp. 455, 463-71 (D. Colo. 1994); Sierra Club v. Cargill, 11 F.3d 1545,
1548-50 (10th Cir. 1993); Res. Ltd. v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529, 1536-37 (D. Mont. 1991).
162. See NFMA § 6(i) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i)). An A.L.R. annotation records almost five
dozen reported opinions in the courts of appeal construing this provision in resolving challenges to the
Service. See Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i)
and Implementing Regulations Requiring Consistency of Resource Plans, Contracts, and Other Instruments with
Forest System Land and Resource Management Plans for Units of National Forest, 8 A.L.R. Fed. 3d (2016)
(current as of November 2021).
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(4); cf. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Bradford, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 121618 (D. Mont. 2010) (holding that Service violated NFMA because proposed action’s compliance with
applicable plan could not be determined from the record); Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 297 F.3d 1012, 1032-34 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that how forest plan is to be amended falls
to supervisor’s judgment); Native Ecosystems Co. v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that timber sales could amend plan consistent with NFMA § 6).
164. See, e.g., Intermountain Forest Indus. Ass’n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330, 1339-44 (D. Wyo.
1988); Forest Guardians v. Dombeck, 131 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1997); Friends of the Se.’s Future
v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 1998); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d
866, 880-81 (D. Ariz. 2006); Silverton Snowmobile Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 433 F.3d 772, 785-86 (10th
Cir. 2006); Sierra Nevada Forest Protect. Campaign, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1333-37 (E.D. Cal. 2008);
Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1187-92 (9th Cir. 2011); Friends of the Wild Swan v.
Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2014); Wild Wilderness v. Allen, 871 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir.
2017); Greenpeace, Inc. v. Cole, 50 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1166-69 (D. Alaska 2014); In re Big Thorne Project,
857 F.3d 968, 973-76, 974 n.3 (9th Cir. 2017); Native Ecosystems Council v. Marten, 883 F.3d 783, 79194 (9th Cir. 2018); All. for the Wild Rockies v. U.S. Forest Serv., 907 F.3d 1105, 1112-14 (9th Cir. 2018).
165. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(4); see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(f) (1983); 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.13(a)-(c)
(2020).
166. On the judicial construction of this “significance” test, see Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2005), Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Cartwright, 29 F. Supp.
2d 1100, 1115-16 (D. Ariz. 1998), All. for Wild Rockies, 907 F.3d at 1113-14. In holding that the plans were
not binding and so not to be reviewed, the Court reasoned in Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S.
726, 733 (1998), that the LRMP being challenged did not “command anyone to do anything or to refrain
from doing anything,” nor did it “grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or authority,”
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sole focus of challengers,167 have interlocked with those on biodiversity and fire
planning just when scientists active in these fields are themselves stressing how little
we really know from their work. In short, the statutes are a composite of related
pieces that have yet to be developed into a coherent whole. The judicial experience
makes this unmistakable, as Part III explains.
III. THE NFS STATUTES IN COURT: DECADES OF LITIGATION IN

RETROSPECT
Though uncertain in the 1970s, the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have since made it abundantly clear that statutory constraints on agency
discretion face a range of curbs on their judicial enforcement.168 Article III standing
doctrine, the prerequisites of reviewable agency action under our Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), and “ripeness” notions have all grown considerably in the last
three decades. The Supreme Court has stressed repeatedly that federal courts are illequipped to judge agencies’ technical or scientific choices169 and that agencies’
interpretations of their own rules are ordinarily afforded deference.170 The lane in
which Service optimizing judgments are reviewed for their fit with the statutes is
narrow, increasingly crowded, and heavily strategized. It is one thing for personnel
in Congress to expect the Service to perform for Congress.171 It is something else to
distinguish the constraints reviewing courts ought to enforce from those they ought
nor “subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability,” id. Nevertheless, several opinions in the lower federal
courts since Ohio Forestry have faulted the Service for failing to follow its own plans and have remanded
challenged actions on that basis alone. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
167. See Weiss, supra note 59, at 646-50; Cheever, supra note 59, at 623-44; Parent, supra note 59,
at 708-11; Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 59, at 63-95; WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 11788.
168. Not until 1970 did the Court resolve that “standing” to file an APA petition had a
constitutional dimension. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-56 (1970).
And only in 1977 did the Court finally resolve that the APA’s provisions on review supplied neither subject
matter jurisdiction nor an independent cause of action for that review. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.
99, 104-07 (1977). In short, judge-made law has long comprised the forms and scope of actions for
petitioning Article III courts to review Forest Service actions. See Scalia, supra note 55, at 884-909.
169. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569-72 (2019); EPA v. EME Homer
City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 514-24 (2014); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700-04 (1995); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87,
100-03 (1983).
170. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170-71 (2007); Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1997); Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 699-706
(1991); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410
(1945).
171. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 765
(2014) (noting from their survey research in Congress that individual respondents viewed Congress’s
primary interpretive relationship as being with agencies, not courts).
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to observe to that end. As Section A explains, the legal interests that qualify for
adjudication are quite specialized. And as Section B shows, they animate only a small
part of the NFS statutes.

A. Of Article III and Equitable Discretion: The Entitlement to a Forum
The entitlement to a federal forum has evolved considerably over the past
century.172 The jurisdictional prerequisites have changed the most.173 Plaintiffs today
need a sufficiently private stake, a “litigable interest,”174 before there can be
jurisdiction and, thus, law exposition by a court. In 1972, Sierra Club v. Morton175
outlined a constitutional standing doctrine for “environmental” plaintiffs.176 This was
the backdrop for the rise of the NFS statutes, 1974-78. In the decades since, however,
the Court’s precedents have turned Morton’s innovation into a revolution.177
172. Historically, a “cause of action” was that merger of facts, relationships, status, and alleged
harm(s) that, when pled and proven, entitled one to judicial relief. See Anthony J. Bellia, Article III and
the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 782-92 (2004); Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 227, 230-58 (1990); William F. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 232-50 (1988);
Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1265, 1269-82 (1961).
173. Following the adoption of the federal rules merging law and equity in 1938 and the APA’s
passage in 1946, the cause of action as a concept splintered, allowing jurisdiction, standing, and remedial
discretion into the gaps. See Bellia, supra note 172, at 827-38; Fletcher, supra note 172, at 224-28; Jaffe,
supra note 172, at 1307-14; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 255, 261-288 (1961). The Court held in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), that jurisdiction cannot
be defeated on the grounds that a plaintiff’s claims, there brought directly under the Constitution, lacked
a discrete cause of action because the cause of action went to the merits of a case and not its jurisdiction.
See id. at 682-84.
174. See James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable Interests, and Article III’s Case or Controversy
Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 213-17, 223-28 (2018). A vast literature tracks these developments in
environmental and natural resources law generally. A succinct recent review as to public lands is James
M. McElfish, Jr., Developments in Standing for Public Lands and Natural Resources Litigation, 48 ENV’T L.
REP. 11098 (2018).
175. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
176. See id. at 740-41. As the Morton Court stressed, the “environmental” plaintiff typically sues to
protect interests shared broadly with an indefinite class of others. See id. at 734 (“[T]he fact that particular
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of
legal protection through the judicial process.”). Morton followed the Court’s opinion in Camp treating the
personal injury element as an aspect of Article III. After decades of experience, however, a growing
“chorus” of jurists maintain that this requirement is circular and incoherent. See Sierra v. City of
Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110, 1115-40 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, concurring).
177. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1972); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 98-100 (1983); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984); Lujan v. Def.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332
(2006); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009);
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014);
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The touchstone has been whether the plaintiff’s alleged interest and the
forum’s potential protection thereof are sufficiently fixed and related.178 That nexus
has only grown more opaque as the NFS statutes have aged.179 Article III standing is
now the Justice Department’s favorite answer to challenges to the Forest Service and
for good reason: the right to a forum, even supposing the Service’s actions are
contrary to law, is now embedded in scores of fact-specific judgments about what
suffices as a litigable interest in the NFS.180 For added measure, even claims aligned
with an urgent public need can be rejected as beyond Article III if the court views
them as especially difficult factually or politically.181

Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136
S. Ct. 1540 (2016); Pfander, supra note 174, at 201-12; see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation
of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061 (2015); Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 549
(2008).
178. In Lujan, no majority could agree how proximate in time or space a threatened injury must be
to the plaintiff’s claimed interests. See 504 U.S. at 572-81 (Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring). But in
Summers a majority squarely rejected the contention that a “statistical probability” of future injury from
the agency action(s) in question would suffice for Article III purposes. See 555 U.S. at 497-501. Because
“[a] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought,” Friends of the Earth,
528 U.S. at 185, this has left open the possibility that even allegedly “imminent” injuries threatened but
not yet realized face special pleading or proof burdens. Compare Babbitt v. United Farmworkers Nat’l
Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (“One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to
obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.”), with Summers, 555 U.S. at
496 (“Accepting an intention to visit the National Forests as adequate to confer standing to challenge any
Government action affecting any portion of those forests would be tantamount to eliminating the
requirement of a concrete, particularized injury in fact.”).
179. See, e.g., Sharps v. U.S. Forest Serv., 823 F. Supp. 668, 672-74 (D.S.D. 1993); Res. Ltd., Inc.
v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529, 1533-34 (D. Mont. 1991), rev’d, 35 F.3d 1300, 1304-08 (9th Cir. 1993);
Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Co. v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 804-11 (11th Cir. 1993); Sierra
Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 757-60 (8th Cir. 1994); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 611-13 (7th
Cir. 1995); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain. v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2002); Wyo. Sawmills
Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.2d 1241, 1246-49 (10th Cir. 2004); Heartwood, Inc. v. Agpaoa, 628 F.3d
261, 266-69 (6th Cir. 2010); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 172 (9th Cir. 2011); Sierra
Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2011); Jayne v. Sherman, 706 F.3d 994, 999
(9th Cir. 2013); WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2015); Cottonwood
Env’t Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015).
180. See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1169-75 (9th Cir. 2020) (reviewing standing
doctrine as applied to claimed interests and injuries from climate change); Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2015) (same); Fallon, supra note 177, at 1064-92; Elliott,
supra note 177, at 465-500; Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little
Secret, 107 NW. L. REV. 169, 175-202 (2012).
181. Cf. Rucho v. Common Cause, 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019) (holding that because “federal
courts are not equipped to apportion political power as a matter of fairness” and because “[t]here are no
legal standards discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments,” complaints about partisan
gerrymandering were nonjusticiable and beyond Article III). Rucho has not yet appeared in an NFS case.
It cannot be far off, though.
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Ripeness has become a looming presence in the circuits of the NFS states
as
Because so many of the Service’s statutory constraints operate only
through the regulations they anticipate, challengers arguably must prove that no
conceivable set of circumstances could support the Service’s policy choices.183 It
remains to be seen what the Court has in store for its Article III doctrines,184 but it
is increasingly evident that at present they are aligned decidedly against most
challenges to the Forest Service’s policy judgments.185
Lastly, APA review reaches only “final” agency actions.186 The Court has
stressed that agency actions marking the “consummation” of administrative decisionmaking in which “rights or obligations have been determined” and from which “legal
consequences will flow” are final and qualify for review.187 Here, too, the issue has
become how immediate or direct the connection between agency action and legal
interest must be.188 Because intermediacy, spatial imprecision, and temporal lagging
well.182

182. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 614 (7th Cir. 1995); Coal. for Sustainable Res.,
Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1244, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 2001); Wilderness Soc’y v. Thomas, 188 F.3d
1130, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 1999); San Juan Citizens All. v. Stiles, 654 F.3d 1038, 1046-50 (10th Cir. 2011);
WildEarth Guardians v. Mont. Snowmobile Ass’n, 790 F.3d 920, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2015); Or. Nat. Desert
Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 957 F.3d 1024, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2020).
183. Cf. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745 (1987)). At least one court denied even declaratory relief against the United States under
FRRRPA, citing the President and Secretary’s budgetary and other powers delegated by Congress. See
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 926-28 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
184. Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, A Cause of Action, Anyone?: Federal Equity and the Preemption of State
Law, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1807, 1824-29 (2016) (discussing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85 (1983), Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535
U.S. 635 (2002), Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), and the
Supreme Court’s uneven demand that federal statutes include discrete causes of action before lower federal
courts may entertain private claims for their enforcement).
185. See, e.g., Fed. Forest Res. Coal. v. Vilsack, 100 F. Supp. 3d 21, 42-47 (D.D.C. 2015)
(dismissing timber concerns’ challenges to 2012 planning regulation amendments for lack of standing);
Sierra Club v. Petersen, 228 F.3d 559, 562-70 (5th Cir. 2000).
186. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 701(b)(2), 551(3); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885-900
(1990). Because the NFS statutes lack a private cause of action, challengers are left to the APA for petitions
to review Service actions. See U.S. Army Corps Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813-16
(2016); Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 125-28 (2012); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 6165 (2004); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796801 (1992); Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890-91; Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239-43
(1980).
187. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78. Bennett has been criticized by more than one commentator for its
ahistorical approach to the APA and vagueness as applied in the lower courts. See, e.g., Steven J. Lindsay,
Note, Timing Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations in Chevron’s Shadow, 127 YALE L.J. 2448, 2474-80
(2017) (collecting commentary and extending it).
188. See, e.g., Kettle Range Conservation Grp. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 148 F. Supp. 2d. 1107, 1114
(E.D. Wash. 2001); Coal. for Sustainable Res., 259 F.3d at 1251-53; Siskiyou Reg’l Educ. Proj. v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 565 F.3d 545, 553-54 (9th Cir. 2009); Utah Native Plant Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 923
F.3d 860, 865-75 (10th Cir. 2019).
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are all so common to the forests and the NFS statutes,189 a great deal of Service
programming is unreviewable for lack of an adequate APA target.
Between them, standing, ripeness, and finality entangle three of the four
aspects of the NFS statutes’ subtle structure—the regulation, resulting guidelines
and standards, and the unit-level plans implementing them—in precedents limiting
the availability of a forum. Land and resource Management Plan (LRMP) revisions
were the focus in Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club.190 The petitioners had
challenged the final Wayne National Forest’s LRMP’s consistency with the
statutes.191 The court of appeals had credited the claims, remanding the plan as
inconsistent with the statute’s “protective spirit” regarding high-yield forestry.192
The Supreme Court reversed, though, with an opinion drawing most claims against
LRMP revisions into doubt as not presenting sufficiently tangible injuries “of a
strictly legal kind.”193 If the Wayne LRMP was “law,” it was not law the federal
courts were to review for fit with the statutes. Some other, more immediately
injurious action was needed. That holding, even if consonant with earlier equitable
doctrines,194 went above and beyond the APA’s finality requirements in challenges
to NFS policies, guidance, rules, etc.195 Ohio Forestry is known across the NFS, and,
in retrospect, the precedents following it have shifted the federal courts’ role in
Congress’s scheme considerably. Diminished judicial oversight of the sort that has
resulted from these changes in the availability of a federal forum, though, can still be
significant. Part B sharpens the focus there.

189. See, e.g., Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 192 F.2d 922, 924-26 (9th Cir. 1999); Sharps
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 28 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 1994); cf. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488,
496 (denying standing to petitioner who had sworn affidavits of his intent to visit the national forest on
the grounds that specific areas within the forest had not been identified).
190. 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
191. See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 249-52 (6th Cir. 1997).
192. See id. at 252.
193. Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. at 733. The Court was unequivocal, stating that
LRMPs “do not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing anything; they do not grant,
withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or authority; they do not subject anyone to any civil
or criminal liability; they create no legal rights or obligations.” Id. (paraphrasing United States v. L.A. &
Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1927)).
194. The Court’s resort to equity in Ohio Forestry was tacit but it tapped a deep root. See, e.g., Port
of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 68-71 (1970); Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United S.tates, 316 U.S. 407, 410-12 (1942); Rochester Tele. Corp. v. U.S., 307 U.S.
754, 129-32 (1939); L.A. & Salt L. R.R. Co., 273 U.S. at 309-10.
195. The Ohio Forestry Court, like the Abbott Labs Court, only loosely distinguished finality from
ripeness. But it did highlight the equitable balancing being done. See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 735-37; see
also Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 814 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Both
aspects of the inquiry involve the exercise of judgment, rather than the application of a black-letter rule.”).
Indeed, the Ohio Forestry Court expanded Abbott Labs’ two factors to three: (1) whether delayed review
would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere
with further administrative action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit from further factual
development of the issues presented. Id. at 733.
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B. Applying the Constraints: Precedent, Deference, and Data on the NFS
As already mentioned, an especially contentious part of the constrained
optimization has been the Service’s ‘provision for’ “diversity” of “plant and animal
communities.”196 The original regulations197 levied a series of “minimum
requirements” for discrete forest resources,198 including that “[f]orest planning shall
provide for diversity of plant and animal communities and tree species consistent with
the overall multiple use objectives of the planning area,”199 while separately specifying a
second set of requirements, including that
“[m]anagement prescriptions, where appropriate and to the extent
practicable, shall preserve and enhance the diversity of plant and
animal communities, including endemic and desirable naturalized
plant and animal species, so that it is at least as great as that which
would be expected in a natural forest and the diversity of tree
species similar to that existing in the planning area.”200
As to the fish and wildlife “purpose,” the expectations were more manifest
but hardly explicit.201 The core ambiguity was whether protecting habitat or
196. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
197. The 1979 regulation, heavily influenced by the independent “Committee of Scientists,” was
overhauled in 1982 following the Reagan Administration’s review. See National Forest Service System
Land and Resource Management Planning, 47 Fed. Reg. 7678, 7679-81 (proposed Feb. 22, 1982); National
Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 47 Fed. Reg. 43,026, 43,036 (1982). The 1982
regulation formed the basis of every LRMP that was in effect by the time the 2012 regulation was being
prepared. See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 76 Fed. Reg. 8480, 8481 (proposed
Feb. 14, 2011). Significantly, however, the 1982 regulation’s restructuring created several key ambiguities
as to the responsibilities toward diversity being levied on unit-level planning.
198. The 1982 regulation’s sections 219.14 to 219.26 set forth “minimum requirements for
integrating individual forest resource planning into the forest plan.” See 47 Fed. Reg. 43,026 at § 219.13.
These treated timber, wilderness, fish and wildlife, grazing, recreation, minerals, water and soil, cultural
and historical, and research natural areas as well as diversity. See id. at §§ 219.14-219.26. Diversity was
defined as “[t]he distribution and abundance of different plant and animal communities and species within
the area covered” by an LRMP. See id. at § 219.3.
199. 36 C.F.R. § 219.26 (emphasis added). The consistency proviso mirrored that in NFMA §
6(g)(3)(B).
200. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27(g). Section 219.27, entitled “[m]anagement requirements,” became a
separate, independent list of prescriptions in the 1982 revision, derived from the 1979 version but recoded
and renamed “minimum specific management requirements to be met in accomplishing goals and
objectives for the [NFS].” Id.; see 47 Fed. Reg. at 43,035-36, 43,050-52. In that second list of requirements
intended to “guide the development, analysis, approval, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of
forest plans,” “diversity” was twice referenced. See §§ 219.27(a)(5), 219.27(g). The regulation said nothing
of the different sets of prescriptions’ intended or expected interoperation(s).
201. The “minimum requirement” for fish and wildlife was that “[f]ish and wildlife habitat shall be
managed to maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the
planning area.” Id. at § 219.19. It continued that “[i]n order to insure that viable populations will be
maintained, habitat must be provided to support, at least, a minimum number of reproductive individuals
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protecting select populations was to be the goal.202 “Management indicator species”
[MISs] were to be chosen, and their population changes used to “indicate the effects
of management activities on other species of selected major biological communities
or on water quality.”203 The Service eventually decided the regulation required only
its management of habitat.204 The decade of litigation that ensued faced not just the
regulation’s meaning but myriad agency judgments and compounding judicial
precedents as well.205 Then, as now, such management prescriptions depended
directly on the means of verification.206 And what data must, should, or may be used
and that habitat must be well distributed so that those individuals can interact with others in the planning
area.” Id. A further, “minimum specific management requirement,” id. at § 219.27(a), was that plans
“[p]rovide for adequate fish and wildlife habitat to maintain viable populations of existing native
vertebrate species and provide that habitat for [management indicator species] is maintained and improved
to the degree consistent with multiple-use objectives established in the plan,” id. at § 219.27(a)(5).
202. The fish and wildlife “minimum requirement” included seven itemized subsections pertaining
to: (1) the selection of “management indicator species,” (2) the selection of planning alternatives; (3)
monitoring and consideration of different data types surrounding wildlife abundance. See id. at §
219.19(a)(1)-(7). Whether habitat or populations were to be the objective, however, was not clear. See
Biodiversity Conservation All. v. Jiron, 762 F.3d 1036, 1061-68 (10th Cir. 2014) (concluding that either
interpretation was “reasonable” and deferring to Service’s interpretation because regulation was
ambiguous). The litigation testing these requirements only began once LRMPs prepared pursuant to the
1982 rule were finalized and Forest Service actions implementing those plans were being planned or
undertaken. See Env’t Protect. Info. Ctr. v. Blackwell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1205-14 (N.D. Cal. 2004);
Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 619-21 (7th Cir. 1995).
203. 36 C.F.R. 219.19(a)(1) (1983).
204. This split the courts of appeal, as acknowledged in Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1, 6-7, 7
n.10 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the regulation required plans to protect viable populations of MIS and
other species in the planning area); see also Colo. Env’t Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1168-71 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that regulation required only the management of habitat for fish and wildlife
purposes); Inland Empire Pub. Lands Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 760-63 (9th Cir. 1996)
(same).
205. The alignment of habitat as proxy for populations and populations as proxy for diversity (or
“fish and wildlife” purposes) became known throughout the Ninth Circuit as the “proxy-on-proxy” war.
See Colo. Env’t Coal., 185 F.3d at 1169-70; Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1153-54 (9th
Cir. 1998); Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 971-73 (9th Cir. 2002); Blackwell, 389 F.
Supp.2d at 1214-20; Lands Co. v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1036-37, 1036 n.23 (9th Cir. 2005); Native
Ecosystems Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 2005); Ecology Ctr. v. Austin, 430
F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2005); Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1173-77 (9th
Cir. 2006); Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1005, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2006); Or. Nat.
Res. Council Fund v. Goodman, 505 F.3d 884, 889-91 (9th Cir. 2007); Native Ecosystems Council v.
Tidwell, 599 F.3d 926, 933-36 (9th Cir. 2010); Hapner v. Tidwell, 621 F.3d 1239, 1246-48 (9th Cir.
2010); Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469-72 (9th Cir. 2010); Earth Island Inst. v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 697 F.3d 1010, 1013-19 (9th Cir. 2012); Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936,
948-49 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Big Thorne Project, 857 F.3d 968, 974-76 (9th Cir. 2017).
206. Indicator metrics generally raise troublesome questions in ecology and NFS indicator species
have been no exception. See Ryan P. Kelly & Margaret R. Caldwell, “Not Supported by Current Science”:
The National Forest Management Act and the Lessons of Environmental Monitoring for the Future of Public
Resources Management, 32 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 151 (2013). As Kelly and Caldwell noted, because the 1982
regulation did not direct forest supervisors to use MIS for any specific purpose, managers were free to use
or not use them for any number of permissible aims—leading to confusion and frustration. Id. at 184.
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to inform Service judgments, whether for “diversity” or for fish/wildlife purposes,
was never clear from the original regulation.207 Indeed, contests over monitoring
duties soon consumed the legal disputes over protecting biotic and community
integrity.208 But it was never lost on the Service that biologists predisposed toward
“conservation” could beg the very questions they were asked to answer: there can be
no statements of biological fact which are dictated by value priorities.209
The Service forged ahead, though, undeterred by challengers seeking more
attention to populations, with what it has styled “habitat analysis.”210 By drastically
207. The 1982 regulation stated that every forest plan “shall contain” “[m]onitoring and evaluation
requirements that will provide a basis for a periodic determination and evaluation of the effects of
management practices.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(d) (1983). This mandate was independent of a prescription
that Forest Supervisors “shall obtain and keep current inventory data appropriate for planning and
managing the resources” within that supervisor’s jurisdiction. Id. at § 219.12(d). Finally, the regulation
stated that “[i]nventories shall include quantitative data making possible the evaluation of diversity in
terms of its prior and present condition.” Id. at § 219.26.
208. See Kelly & Caldwell, supra note 206, at 181. Several early opinions from the courts of appeal
differed over the Service’s duties to collect population-oriented or habitat-oriented data. See, e.g., Swanson
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 344-45 (9th Cir. 1996); Inland Empire Pub. Lands Co., 88 F.3d at 76063 (holding that habitat-oriented information was sufficient); Martin, 168 F.3d at 5-8 (holding that
habitat-oriented information was insufficient and that Service’s interpretation of regulation was entitled
to deference); Colo. Env’t Coal., 185 F.3d at 1170. That split in the circuits led to highly strategized
advocacy surrounding the original regulation’s terms and intent. See Ecology Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
192 F.3d 922, 924-26 (9th Cir. 1999); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 127980 (D.N.M. 2001); Utah Env’t Cong. v. Zieroth, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1268-72 (D. Utah 2002);
Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain. v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1066-71 (9th Cir. 2002); Idaho Sporting Cong.,
305 F.3d at 967-68; Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 2003);
Utah Env’t Cong. v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219, 1224-28 (10th Cir. 2004); Lands Council v. Powell, 395
F.3d 1019, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2005); Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 352 F. Supp. 2d 909, 917-18 (D. Minn.
2005); Utah Env’t Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1190-94 (10th Cir. 2006); Utah Env’t Cong. v.
Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1132, 1135-37 (10th Cir. 2007); Utah Env’t Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F.3d 1269,
1282-88 (10th Cir. 2007); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 641 F.3d 423, 443-44 (10th Cir. 2011);
Biodiversity Conserv. All. v. Jiron, 762 F.3d 1036, 1061-63 (10th Cir. 2014).
209. In the 2002 proposal and ill-fated 2005 finalized revision of the planning regulations, the
Service eliminated species-specific LRMP requirements in favor of vague “sustainability” criteria. See
National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1027, 1048-49 (2005). It cited
the biological uncertainties of a species or population focus, rejecting the recommendations of both
Committees of Scientists. Id. at 1048. By the turn of this century, not coincidentally, the one basic “law
of ecology” biologists had generally accepted—that species diversity always increases with area—had
become a matter of considerable professional debate. See Mark V. Lomolino, The Species-Area Relationship:
New Challenges for an Old Pattern, 25(1) PROG. PHYS. GEOG. 1 (2001) (maintaining that the law is either
tautological or in need of significant revision and qualification). Indeed, that lost consensus coincided with
a splintering of support for conservation biology’s approach to hypothesis uncertainty—an approach
supposedly grounded in ‘erring on the side of caution.’ See Graeme Caughley, Directions in Conservation
Biology, 62 J. ANIMAL ECOLOGY 215 (1994) (contrasting “small population” with “declining population”
work on biotic abundance and persistence and showing inconsistent prevailing statistical methods).
210. See Lands Council v. McNair, 629 F.3d 1070, 1076-79 (9th Cir. 2010); Lands Council v.
McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 994-99 & nn. 10-12 (9th Cir. 2008). This “habitat analysis” remained the focus in
both the 2005 and 2012 regulations. See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed.
Reg. 1023, 1028-29 (2005) (describing 2005 rule’s reliance on overall “sustainability” and its components);
National Forest System Land Management Planning, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,162, 21,174-76 (2012) (describing a
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limiting the populations-as-surrogate tool in its 2012 rule,211 the Service claimed to
acknowledge for the first time (in the regulation) that there “are limits to Agency
authority and the inherent capability of the land” in sustaining extant biota in
place.212 Measuring and managing for habitat, though, is at best a poor substitute for
monitoring and maintaining the distribution and abundance of biota.213 As conducted
thus far, it is utterly devoid of transparency and the accountability it brings.214 It is
also a strange way to ease information burdens: habitat is typically some collection
of necessary and sufficient conditions for an organism.215 Unsurprisingly, the Service
has yet to demonstrate any scientific merit to its habitat analyses.216 Indeed, the
shift to monitoring “focal species” as surrogates for the “ecological conditions necessary to maintain the
diversity of plant and animal communities”).
211. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 21,175, 21,212-19 (explaining the replacement of MIS and MIS monitoring
requirements with a mandate for “ecological sustainability” employing a “coarse filter” and “fine filter”
approach making sparing use of “focal species” and “species of conservation concern” only as needed); 36
C.F.R. § 219.9(b) (2020) (leaving species-specific plan components contingent on a finding of necessity
by responsible official).
212. 77 Fed. Reg. at 21,213.
213. See Courtney A. Schultz et al., Wildlife Conservation Planning Under the United States Forest
Service’s 2012 Planning Rule, 77(3) J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 428, 436-38 (2013). It is worth noting that the
second Committee of Scientists—the last the Service empaneled—also concluded that “[h]abitat alone
cannot be used to predict wildlife populations,” and that “diversity is sustained only when individual
species persist; the goals of ensuring viability [of species] and providing for diversity are inseparable.”
COMM. OF SCIENTISTS, SUSTAINING THE PEOPLE’S LANDS
19,
38
(1999),
https://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nfma/includes/cosreport/Committee%20of%20Scientists%20Report.htm.
Finally, the Service’s own technical manual acknowledges as much, prefacing its ten chapters with the
disclaimer that “[t]he emphasis on habitat monitoring in this guide does not replace the need to assess
population status and trend.” USDA FOREST SERV., GTR-WO-89, A TECHNICAL GUIDE FOR
MONITORING WILDLIFE HABITAT § 1.3.2 (2013).
214. This has been a problem in ecological research generally. See Timothy H. Parker et al.,
Transparency in Ecology and Evolution: Real Problems, Real Solutions, 31 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY &
EVOLUTION 711, 711-12 (2016); Aaron M. Ellison, Repeatability and Transparency in Ecological Research, 91
ECOLOGY 2536 (2010). The Service’s habitat focus is emblematic, though. See Parker et al., supra, at 71117.
215. In the 2012 rulemaking, the Service defended its approach by arguing that monitoring’s costs
trade-off of other management priorities. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 21,255-21,256. But as its own specialists have
observed, it is specific attributes of an environment that organisms select as their habitat (generally a
collocation of both biotic and abiotic resources). See TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 213, at §§ 1.3.1, 2.1,
2.2. This would seem to multiply the aspects of the environment to be monitored—or, barring that, the
ways in which the analysis can be confounded. See id. at § 5.2.2 (noting that single-attribute habitat
classifications are prone to over-estimations because “[h]abitat quality is often a conditional function of
the simultaneous conditions of several attributes, such that measuring one or a few attributes does not
sufficiently assess their joint contribution toward habitat quality”).
216. Cushman and colleagues, from the largest dataset ever employed in such analyses, found that
sufficiency of vegetation community types as proxies for habitat was highly dependent on the attributes
and spatial scales by which communities were defined and that, at most, cover type could explain only
about 4% of total variance in bird abundance. See Samuel A. Cushman et al., Do Forest Community Types
Provide a Sufficient Basis to Evaluate Biological Diversity?, 6 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & ENV’T 13, 17
(2008). The Service’s own technical manual agrees. See TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 213, at 2.2.2
(noting that most vegetation attributes measured as habitat are really proxies for the attribute of interest,
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existence and strength of associations between habitat change and biodiversity
remain quite controversial among professional ecologists.217 What those associations
reveal about relevant causes is still more uncertain,218 not least because the Service
usually does not share data from its habitat analyses.219 The more judgments about
habitat analysis instead of place-based population monitoring that were litigated,
though, the less reviewing courts seemed inclined to oblige the challengers.220 Courts
confronted with judgments optimizing for competing objectives amid multiple
uncertainties confront the same epistemic dilemmas Congress worked to overcome
with an elaborate architecture—yet do so within the confines of a single case or

leaving any such measurement at least two steps removed from population abundance or ecological
integrity).
217. Species richness and abundance have long divided community ecologists, with both
deterministic and stochastic theories vying for attention. Compare STEPHEN P. HUBBELL, THE UNIFIED
NEUTRAL THEORY OF BIODIVERSITY AND BIOGEOGRAPHY 10 (2001) (“I believe that we should
seriously question why our theories in ecology always start with the presumption of the indefinite
coexistence of all species. All the evidence of which I am aware supports entirely the opposite conclusion—
namely, that all species are transient and ultimately go extinct.”), with Quinn & Dunham, supra note 147,
at 609 (“Effects of interspecific interaction are notoriously difficult to measure directly without recourse
to experimental techniques, which in many cases are infeasible.”).
218. David Tilman, Ecological Experimentation: Strengths and Conceptual Problems, in LONG-TERM
STUDIES IN ECOLOGY: APPROACHES AND ALTERNATIVES 136 (G.E. Likens ed., 1989) (arguing that
ecology is the study of causes of patterns in nature and that observation is only sufficient if paired with
experimentation and theory).
219. This is especially noteworthy because data transparency has been a major change agent in
ecological research over the past decade. See B.A. Nosek et al., Promoting an Open Research Culture, 348
SCIENCE 1422 (June 2015); Michael C. Whitlock, Data Archiving in Ecology and Evolution: Best Practices,
26 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 61 (2011).
220. See, e.g., League of Wilderness Def. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1197-1200 (D.
Or. 2006), rev’d in part on other grounds, 549 F.3d 1211, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2008); Forest Guardians v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 495 F.3d 1162, 1168-71 (10th Cir 2007); Utah Env’t Cong. v. Russell, 518 F.3d 817, 827-32
(10th Cir. 2008); Ecology Ctr. v. Castaneda, 574 F.3d 652, 664-66 (9th Cir. 2009); Hapner v. Tidwell,
621 F.3d 1239, 1246-50 (9th Cir. 2010); Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469-72 (9th Cir.
2010); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 641 F.3d 423, 440-43 (10th Cir. 2011); San Juan Citizens
All. v. Stiles, 654 F.3d 1038, 1045-49 (10th Cir. 2011); Native Ecosystems Council v. Weldon, 697 F.3d
1043, 1056-59 (9th Cir. 2012); Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 697 F.3d 1010, 1013-18 (9th Cir.
2012); Biodiversity Conservation All. v. Jiron, 762 F.3d 1036, 1061-82 (10th Cir. 2014); Friends of the
Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 947-50 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Big Thorne Project, 857 F.3d 968, 97477 (9th Cir. 2017); All. for the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217-21 (9th Cir. 2017); Native
Ecosystems Council v. Marten, 883 F.3d 783, 791-94 (9th Cir. 2018); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 957 F.3d 1024, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2020).
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controversy.221 Eventually, the volume of judicial precedent itself attenuates any such
claim’s chances legally.222
Empirical analysis of these outcomes would amount to little, practically.223
Counsel quickly, consciously adapt tactics in repeat-play contexts and judges may
view every precedent (or opinion) as shading the landscape anew. In short, data from
subjects that adapt to the intervention or “test” in the field do not merit the label of
“data.”224 Still, some patterns are worth noting, especially in view of the Wilderness
Act’s separate but parallel operation and legacy. Wilderness areas exclude multiple
use and yet have evolved along similar lines.

221. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, in THE PHILOSOPHY
EXPERTISE 111 (Evan Selinger & Robert P. Crease eds., 2006) (arguing that American judges and
juries must necessarily accept or reject expert testimony arbitrarily and will of necessity resort to
credential, demeanor, reputation or other similar kinds of evidence to judge the veracity of the testimony).
Similar outcomes are evident in other optimization areas. See, e.g., Robin K. Craig & Catherine Danley,
Federal Fisheries Management: A Quantitative Assessment of Federal Fisheries Litigation Since 1978, 32 J. LAND
USE & ENV’T L. 381, 405-21 (2017); Erin Ryan, Fisheries Without Courts: How Fishery Management Reveals
Our Dynamic Separation of Powers, 32 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 431, 447-50 (2017).
OF

222. High profile opinions in both the Ninth and Tenth circuits set precise precedents at the height
of the great proxy-on-proxy war, limiting the circumstances in which scientific judgments could be
reviewed. See Utah Env’t Cong. v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that 1982
version of 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 required project-level MIS population monitoring); Utah Env’t Cong. v.
Bosworth, 443 F.3d 732, 749-52 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that monitoring plans implementing LRMPs
may be reviewable as such); Forest Guardians, 495 F.3d at 1168-69 (quoting Bosworth, 443 F.3d at 748, and
holding that LRMP at issue did not adopt 1982 regulation’s requirements on monitoring); Ecology Ctr.
v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Service’s methodological choices were
reviewable for arbitrariness and that a refusal to monitor population-level effects was arbitrary); Lands
Council v. McNair, 494 F.3d 771, 775-76 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Austin, 430 F.3d at 1064, and holding
that Service’s methodological choices may not be “predicated on an unverified hypothesis” and must be
“verified with observation”), reh’g en banc, 537 F.3d 981, 990-92 (9th Cir. 2008) (overruling Austin and
holding that the court will be at its “most deferential” when the agency is “‘making predictions, within its
[area of] special expertise, at the frontiers of science’”) (quoting Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983)).
223. Noted studies of agency win/loss records in the federal courts may suggest otherwise. See, e.g.,
Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (2016); David Zaring,
Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135 (2010); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008). None of these studies, however, focus narrowly on a
single issue or issue set as it has developed in sequence over decades.
224. See Niels Keiding & David Clayton, Standardization and Control for Confounding in Observational
Studies: A Historical Perspective, 29 STAT. SCIENCE 529, 538 (2014). Drawing methodologically sound
empirical inferences from such samples is hard to imagine. Cf. RONALD N. GIERE ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING SCIENTIFIC REASONING 198-205 (5th ed. 2006) (explaining the difference between
deterministic and probabilistic models of individuals and the potential failures in both of identifying the
causal factors at work); Joseph P. Simmons et al., False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data
Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1359 (2011) (showing how
degrees of freedom in data collection often allow social scientists to amass data showing spurious
correlations lacking any real account of causation). Thus, even supposing the familiar selection effects
could be controlled, see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984), I will leave all such inferences to others.
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In a patient study of challenges to the land management agencies under the
Wilderness Act, Professor Appel noticed a pronounced ‘pro-wilderness’ tilt from
reviewing courts, both for and against the agencies.225 The Forest Service, of course,
famously opposed many wilderness designations throughout the NFS.226 The
tendencies Appel noted arguably stemmed from the single most important contrast
with the NFS statutes: deliberate, routine Congressional intervention clearly aimed
at constraining agency discretion.227 As I have argued elsewhere, as a biodiversity
protection tool, the Wilderness Act is imperfect at best.228 It cares little for
ecology.229 But it surely has been Congress’s chief constraint on NFS multiple use.230
Although the average wilderness may not be the “minimum dynamic area” to
withstand typical disturbances as habitat,231 wilderness areas are readily incorporated

225. See Peter A. Appel, Wilderness, the Courts, and the Effect of Politics on Judicial Decisionmaking, 35
HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 275, 294-312 (2011); Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENV’T L.
REV. 62, 96, 113 (2010).
226. See Appel, supra note 225, at 84; ALLIN, supra note 40, at 165.
227. See Appel, supra note 225, at 120-21 (noting that the Wilderness Act has long-standing and
widespread support in Congress); ALLIN, supra note 40, at 186-203 (recounting several key additions to
the National Wilderness Preservation System and the political support of host-state delegations).
Wilderness Act claims, moreover, rarely involve courts in assessing complex optimizations or scientifically
untested professional judgments.
228. See Jamison E. Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 417,
455-60 (2005).
229. See Sara Dant, Making Wilderness Work: Frank Church and the American Wilderness Movement,
77(2) PAC. REV. 237 (2008); ALLIN, supra note 40, at 143-66. In contrast to the NFS statutes, all of which
grew from a common impetus in Congress (and before that in the PLLRC) to join more land use decisionmaking to the systematic study and prediction of environmental impact, the Wilderness Act demands that
the Service manage designated areas “for preserving the wilderness character of the area” while defining
wilderness in aesthetic and spiritual terms. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(b), 1131(c).
230. See Leshy, supra note 41, at 479-82; Appel, supra note 225, at 119-120.
231. Some island biogeographers maintain that habitat reserves should be larger than the largest
disturbance area size if reserves are to maintain habitat and populations intact over time. See, e.g., S.T.A.
Pickett & John N. Thompson, Patch Dynamics and the Design of Nature Reserves, 13 BIOLOGICAL
CONSERVATION 27, 34 (1978) (calling this the “minimum dynamic area”).
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into wider conservation planning232 and broader, system-wide goal-setting.233
Congress can and has done so in places even where local Forest Service personnel
objected.234 Wilderness areas are, furthermore, increasingly vital to fire science and
the study of ignitions, fuels, fire behavior, treatment efficiency, and climate
change.235 They are, in short, as much a focus of the NFS’s future as a window into
its institutional and legal past.
Multiple use, wilderness, and fire are an increasingly contentious
intersection, though. As with community ecology,236 the Service’s cause-to-effect
knowledge is quite scarce.237 Whether it is risk in the wildland-urban interface

232. See, e.g., Keiter, GYE Revisited, supra note 49, at 124-36 (describing Greater Yellowstone).
About half of the habitat reserved to the northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) and other late
successional/old growth-dependent species in the noted Northwest Forest Plan (NFP) was preexisting
wilderness. See Jack Ward Thomas et al., The Northwest Forest Plan: Origins, Components, Implementation
Experience, and Suggestions for Change, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 277, 282 (2006). The NFP, a regional
plan to protect biotic and community diversity across seventeen national forests of the Pacific Northwest,
has been plagued by fire and non-native species invasions that have rendered its original goals insufficient
to protect owl populations. See Thomas A. Spies et al., Old Growth, Disturbance, Forest Succession, and
Management in the Area of the Northwest Forest Plan, in PNW-GTR-966, SYNTHESIS OF SCIENCE TO
INFORM LAND MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN AREA VOL. 1 95, 183-89
(2018).
233. See Thomas et al., supra note 232, at 280-83. As carbon storage has become a focal metric in
the RPA assessments, wilderness areas—where commercial logging is prohibited—have taken on a
renewed significance. See CONG. RSCH. SERV. GTR-WO-94, supra note 133, at 8-2.
234. See, e.g., Christine H. Colburn, Forest Policy and the Quincy Library Group, in Ronald D. Bunner
et al., FINDING COMMON GROUND: GOVERNANCE AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE AMERICAN
WEST 159 (2002).
235. See Miller & Aplet, supra note 46, at 375-79; Marc D. Meyer et al., Structure, Diversity, and
Health of Sierra Nevada Red Fir Forests with Reestablished Fire Regimes, 28 INT’L J. WILDLAND FIRE 386
(2019); Michael S. Hand et al., Examining Heterogeneity and Wildfire Management Expenditures Using
Spatially and Temporally Descriptive Data, 22 J. FOREST ECON. 80, 80-82 (2016).
236. Where the Service has studied population trends in place, the findings have been alarming.
With more than twenty-five years of experience in the Northwest Forest Plan, a single large fire in the
planning area in 2002 and continued interspecific competition from another owl species unraveled the
reserve strategy for protecting northern spotted owls. See Spies et al., supra note 232, at 187; Katie M.
Dugger et al., The Effects of Habitat, Climate, and Barred Owls on Long-term demography of Northern Spotted
Owls, 118 CONDOR 57 (2016) (estimating 3.8% per year declines range-wide from 1985-2013).
237. See Elizabeth Kalies & Larissa L. Yocum Kent, Tamm Review: Are Fuel Treatments Effective at
Achieving Ecological and Social Objectives? A Systematic Review, 375 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 84, 94
(2016) (“Despite millions of dollars spent annually on fuel treatments, and despite the general consensus
that fuel treatments are indeed effective, there is surprisingly little data on fuel treatment effectiveness in
North America, especially as it relates to outcomes other than overstory and fire behavior.”).
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(WUI),238 mandatory reforestation,239 or fuel treatment effectiveness,240 bare
statistical associations have stood in for causal knowledge and the effects of this
approach on understanding and prediction are becoming clear. Forestry claims of this
kind invite their own rejection in today’s political climate, and they invariably elicit
mixed results. Of course, as is true of NEPA,241 the threat of judicial review keeps an
edge. So as carbon storage rises as an objective on the NFS and rapidly expanding
timber production looms,242 how biotic and community diversity can be maintained
amidst threats from fire, climate, and multiple use will remain a troubled
intersection. Without knowing much more about the interacting causes and effects
of fire, reforestation, or biotic relationships, few alternatives can be foreclosed by the
scientific evidence or the statutory constraints because few necessary incompatibilities
can be proven.243
Today, as the bulk of the reported cases challenging Service management
choices involve fire restoration and/or fuel reductions, usually in older forests,244
deep uncertainties and old antipathies are leaving stakeholders and other participants
238. See Jack D. Cohen, Preventing Disaster: Home Ignitability in the Wildland Urban Interface, 98 J.
FORESTRY 15 (2000) (arguing that WUI losses to wildfire are not caused solely by fire but by fire and a
failure to build appropriately in fire prone areas).
239. Cf. North et al., supra note 136, at 213 (noting that harvesting and regeneration should emulate
natural disturbance regimes but that doing so amidst rapidly shifting climate patterns may be impossible).
240. Cf. Agee & Skinner, supra note 11, at 92-93 (noting that if treatments are small and scattered
or long intervals elapse between treatments, they will be less effective at reducing fuel loads).
241. Cf. TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 267 (“[E]ven though the rules found in the case law are rather
general, the courts do more than they say they do. As judges have become more concerned with limiting
unreviewable administrative discretion . . . the agencies have had to worry more about unreviewable
judicial discretion.”).
242. See Kenneth E. Skog et al., Desirable Properties of Wood for Sustainable Development in the Twentyfirst Century, 72 ANN. FOREST SCI. 671, 675-76 (2015) (noting that carbon sequestration factoring would
create significant new demand for structural timber); see Theodore Wegner et al., Uses and Desirable
Properties of Wood in the 21st Century, 108 J. FORESTRY 165, 172 (2010) (same).
243. Cf. Ryan, supra note 221, at 445-48 (noting how frequently challenges to fishery management
optimizing are filed and lost and explaining that challengers sue in proportion to their own degrees of
desperation).
244. See, e.g., Kettle Range Conservation Group v. U.S. Forest Serv., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 112122 (E.D. Wash. 2001); League of Wilderness Def. v. Forsgren, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1064-65 (D. Or.
2002); Sierra Club v. Eubanks, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073-75 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Cascadia Wildlands
Project v. Goodman, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1045 (D. Or. 2004); Utah Env’t Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d
1184, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2006); League of Wilderness Def. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1186,
1991-92 (D. Or. 2006); Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1153-56 (9th Cir. 2006);
Ecology Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2006); Utah Env’t Cong. v. Bosworth,
443 F.3d 732, 736-39 (10th Cir. 2006); League of Wilderness Def. v. Brooks Smith, 491 F. Supp. 2d,
983-84 (D. Or. 2007); Utah Env’t Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F.3d 1269, 1274-80 (10th Cir. 2007); Decker v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 780 F. Supp.2d 1170, 1172-74 (D. Colo. 2011); Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 951 F.
Supp.2d 1100, 1104-05 (E.D. Cal. 2013); Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 940-42 (9th
Cir. 2014); All. for the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2017); Native Ecosystems
Council v. Marten, 883 F.3d 783, 792-96 (9th Cir. 2018); All. for the Wild Rockies v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
907 F.3d 1105, 1112-16 (9th Cir. 2018).
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with a sense of process overload and gridlock.245 We must and can, however, make
these laws into more than they have been. Part IV charts a path to renovating this
legal legacy.
IV. THE NFS STATUTES AS PUBLIC LAW: FOR INTERPRETIVE FIDELITY
Legal theorists’ interest in legislation runs deep.246 Bentham first observed
that statutes can take forms beyond the familiar modal imperatives of forbidding,
permitting, and requiring.247 They can, for example, delegate the authority to make
law.248 Delegation endows another authority,249 but if it does so without constraint
questions about the validity of such authority will arise.250 This remains true today,
even in the wake of centuries of delegation.251 Section A explains the necessity and
propriety of finding and following legislative intent within every delegation, while
Section B isolates and highlights that intent within our NFS statutes.

245. See Matthew McKinney, Whither Public Participation in Federal Land Management? Replicating
Homegrown Innovations in Shared Problem Solving, 48 ENV’T L. REP. 10015, 10017-18 (2018); Squillace,
supra note 117, at 434-47.
246. See Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General (1775), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM (Athlone Press 1970); JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 219-342 (Robert
Campbell ed., 1885). More recently, legislation in legal theory has been understood from the perspective
of the judge(s) who must figure it into contested cases. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 31354 (1986).
247. See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 10526 (1982) (recounting Bentham’s view that law is, as an expression of the lawmaker’s will or volition,
dependent upon a “logic of the will” unique to imperative descriptions). Importantly, Bentham also
noticed that laws can offer rewards for conduct desired as well as punishing conduct to be deterred. Id. at
118 (describing “praemiary” or “invitative” laws as expressions of the lawmaker’s volition similar to other
modal forms).
248. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004).
249. See Peter H. Aronson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1982) (linking attacks on delegation by Locke, Montesquieu, and Madison to this basic fact).
250. See id. at 7-21; THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF
UNITED STATES 94-126 (2d ed. 1979); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 380-85 (1989); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:
USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 1-29 (1997).
THE

251. See Merrill, supra note 248, at 2117 (reviewing a range of interpretations of Article I and its
consistency with several forms of delegated authority); Aronson et al., supra note 249, at 7-17 (reviewing
judicial precedents construing Article I’s control of delegation). Of course, if an interpreter claims its own
authority independent of the legislation, then it may not be the legislature’s “agent,” proper. See FRANK
B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 3 (2009). Indeed, that
interpreter may come to rival the legislature’s agent. Cf. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843 n.9 (1984) (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”).
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A. From ‘Text v. Intent’ to Original Public Meaning
The interpretive problem has twin aspects. First, linguistic meaning is
under-determinative. The raw semantic content of a text is too often insufficient to
establish its meaning. Second, the institutional context of the average legislature
undermines our standard means of clarification: resort to author intentions.252 As
Dean John Manning once put it, “[i]t is impossible to find the ‘will,’ ‘design, ‘intent,’
or ‘mind’” of 100 senators, 435 representatives and a president—three distinct
institutions—without making “some value judgment about what should count as that
legislature’s intended decision and why.”253 And value judgments there may be:
linguistic intuitions, semantics, and other tools rooted in the mechanics of language
are often inadequate.254
Although it may be fundamentally unsound to identify the legislature’s
intent with the intentions or expectations of its members,255 that is not the last word.
For intention is intrinsically a part of a collective act like legislating.256 Legislators
252. “Speaker meaning” touches stubborn philosophical questions. See SCOTT SOAMES,
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 10-20 (2010) (explaining the philosopher Gottlob Frege’s foundational
distinction between sense and reference and several logical contradictions that emerge where speaker
meaning can depart from literal propositional content). Statutes authored by an internally plural author
like Congress, though, clearly are texts with a context. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES
13-16 (2014); DWORKIN, supra note 246, at 318-27, 338.
253. John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397, 2431
(2017); see also Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930); DWORKIN, supra
note 246, at 314-17.
254. Compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 269,
311-21 (2019) (arguing that, in the gap that arises between linguistic intuitions and well-reasoned linguistic
judgments, legislation’s interpreters should have recourse to moral and political values tracking those of
the legislature that authored the legislation), with WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 1-47 (1994) (arguing that textualism fails as a “foundational, constraining
methodology,” as does intentionalism and purposivism, and that “the consequences of accepting one
interpretation over another” must factor into any proper statutory analysis).
255. A noted critique of aggregating individuals’ views or expressions is Radin, supra note 253; see
also Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 239 (1992); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 87 (1982)
(arguing that the Hart and Sacks legal process school’s “main line” was that “[l]egislative intent—if we are
to be honest with ourselves—rarely exists in any unambiguous way”). Much more recent scholarship has
sought to redeem the notion of legislative intent against the dismissals by judges and commentators
following Radin. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REV. 423 (1988); Lawrence Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in
Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 327 (2005); RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE
INTENT (2012); VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY (2016).
256. Cf. Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 995-999 (2017)
(arguing that “[s]tatutory interpretation as practiced involves widespread attribution of legislative intent”
likely because “the Constitution refers to Congress as a single body as opposed to a collection of
individuals”); Henry S. Richardson, Democratic Intentions, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON
REASON AND POLITICS 349, 354-57 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (arguing that seeking
and entrenching reasonable compromises among multiple competing ends held by those deliberating with
each other presupposes a shared intention to project whatever volition results).
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share a common agency organized around rules and plans for realizing that agency.257
Shared agency, we have come to understand, consists to a great extent in joint
intentions.258 But which joint intentions are either necessary or sufficient to constitute
the kind of shared agency we rightly ascribe to legislators?259
First, and not surprisingly, to act in a legislative capacity is to act to
prescribe law.260 Legislation is, in this sense at least, volitional.261 Everywhere
legislatures exist they serve a need to make or to change the law.262 Plans, subplans,
and precursory actions can precede action prescribing law, certainly.263 But making
257. Cf. NOURSE, supra note 255, at 135-60 (arguing that group agency in a legislature may be
inferred from its group actions, which are taken by means of internal procedures, and evidence of decisions
that comprise those actions); EKINS, supra note 255, at 219 (“The defining end of the assembly is the
exercise of legislative capacity, which is to be in a fit state to legislate on particular occasions for the
common good.”); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 69-87 (1999) (arguing that legislators
do not speak to each other as conversationalists but rather as representatives, that their numerosity and
diversity necessitate rules of order, and that voting for or against word-for-word texts is the most practical
means of decision).
258. See MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 408-16 (1989) (arguing that “[i]t is logically
necessary and sufficient for the existence of collectives that each of a set of individuals volunteer” his or
her “will (voluntas, in Latin)” and manifestly cause the “meshing” of those wills which jointly constitute
the plural subject).
259. Cf. BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 183-89 (1993) (arguing that
adapting the “talk” of intention regarding individuals to legislatures as collectives formed for the purpose
of making law is not as difficult as many legal theorists have made it seem). Waldron’s original
contribution to the theory of legislative choice defends the use of majority voting against deliberativists’
charges of irrationality with what he calls “the prospect of persisting disagreement.” See JEREMY
WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 153 (1999). “[O]ur common basis for action in matters of
justice has to be forged in the heat of our disagreements, not predicated on the assumption of a cool
consensus that exists only as an ideal.” Id. at 155.
260. Hart’s renewal of Bentham’s account of the lawmaker’s volition has been both illuminating and
influential. See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 256-62 (1986).
From Bentham and Hart there emerged a now conventional distinction between the common law’s judge,
whose office was not to make but to expound the law as a dynamic, constantly changing organic social
entity, and that judge’s counterpart—the legislator. See id. at 3-80.
261. See Radin, supra note 253, at 876-78. Purposes, of course, are often spelled out in the statute
itself. See Jarrod Shobe, Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 669 (2019). See also
id. at 724 (“Enacted findings and purposes are often the most accurate reflection of the legislative
background and Congress’s intent and purposes . . . .”). Still, an ascribed purpose can be no excuse to
ignore legislation’s selection of ends, means, and specific phrasings. See John F. Manning, The New
Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 148-50 (2011). But a text can do no more than set boundaries on its
own interpretation. See AAHRON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 17-20 (2005)
(categorically excluding the purpose or point of legislative action from its interpretation, thus, seems
unsound).
262. See EKINS, supra note 255, at 113 (“Rational lawmaking is action to change the law in specific
ways for (what the legislature takes to be) good reasons.”); WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra
note 257, at 76 (“Many political scientists have noted the remarkable similarity in parliamentary
procedures around the world. . . . [T]he similarity can . . . be understood as a common human response to
a similar set of problems: the circumstances of procedure, so to speak.”).
263. As Waldron observes, in real legislatures these, too, are typically text-oriented acts and
communication. See WALDRON, supra note 257, at 69-87.
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or changing the law, and perhaps even doing so for (what the legislators take to be)
good reasons, is the point of acting legislatively.264
Second, shared intentions may, notwithstanding the skepticism, amount to
legislative intent.265 As Margaret Gilbert, Michael Bratman, and others’ work on
shared cooperative activity demonstrated, groups of people clearly can share
intentions.266 It is more an empirical question of when their interlocking intentions
emerge and sustain cooperative activity than whether they ever do. Furthermore, the
prospect of “strategic” action is no more a challenge in the legislature than anywhere
else,267 and sincerity seems much more the norm in any event.268
Third, it is at least possible that legislative action has a common meaning for
those authoring it.269 If it has a common meaning, of course, it is at least more likely
to elicit shared intentions (and votes) for or against.270 Several legislation scholars
have shown how Congress’s procedural norms and internal divisions of labor enable
its members to grasp and to respond to such meaning and to make their own elections
that either advance or defeat cooperation.271 Individual intentions that interlock with
264. See EKINS, supra note 255, at 247-49; WALDRON, supra note 257, at 84-86, 129-42;
KATZMANN, supra note 252, at 11-22 (explaining Congress’s internal organization and delegation of roles
to staff and committees in terms of organizing to legislate intentionally); see also James N. Landis, A Note
on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888-90 (1930) (same) (response to Radin).
265. Cf. NOURSE, supra note 255, at 142-53 (rejecting the “intent-as-state-of-mind” tradition and
arguing that intent may be inferred from joint actions, taken sequentially and from feedback, that yield a
group outcome); Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of
Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357, 360-63 (Andrei Marmor
ed. 1995). It is worth noting that “minimalist intention” accounts posit that legislative supremacy—
legislators controlling the law they prescribe—requires at least some residuum of intent. See, e.g., Joseph
Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 267
(Robert P. George ed., 1996); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988). That form of intention, though, is little more than legal fiction.
See Doerfler, supra note 256, at 1022-31 (describing a minimalist, fictional intent derived from context and
“objectified” intent).
266. See, e.g., Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 ETHICS 97, 108-12 (1993); Michael E.
Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV. 327 (1992); GILBERT, supra note 258.
267. See André Blais & Arianna Degan, The Study of Strategic Voting, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
292 (Roger D. Congleton et al. eds., 2018).

OF PUBLIC CHOICE

268. See Blais & Degan, supra note 267.
269. See Solan, supra note 255, at 442-49; BIX, supra note 259, at 188; Joseph Raz, Interpretation
Without Retrieval, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 155, 156-72 (Andrei
Marmor ed., 1995).
270. Even leading legislation scholars have mistakenly inferred that because legislative intent is
often “unknowable,” it is therefore practically irrelevant. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 254, at 16-25. But
we need not commit to such fallacies. It is possible that some legislation has shared intentions backing it
while some does not. As Alexander put it, “the price of denying the facticity of intentions is quite high.”
Alexander, supra note 265, at 379. Without it, “there is nothing but the norms and beliefs of the interpreter
to determine what ought to be done at any later time, norms and beliefs that themselves cannot be
projected authoritatively into the future.” Id.
271. See, e.g., Sitamaran, supra note 66, at 119-24; Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation
and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 843-47 (2014); Gluck & Bressman, supra
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one another to form such unities should be little mystery.272 By their (cooperative)
actions sequencing the process in which a legislative chamber receives a bill from its
committee, debates it, votes it up or down, and reconciles its bill with that of its
sibling chamber, legislators form interlocking intentions to take joint action.273
Members of the legislature so acting share a joint, interlocking intent to prescribe
law pursuant to the standing rules of procedure.274 A legislature that persists over
time and prescribes laws in sequence, as happened with the NFS statutes, is one that
has repeatedly defied strong forces tending toward inaction and/or deferment.275
Finally, legislation’s dependence on natural language instead of formal logic
or algorithm often puts interpreters to imperfect tools.276 But as projections of
volition, it is always possible that statutes contribute to some bigger whole.277
Understanding such volitions is an unavoidably humanistic task. Texts on human
planning are easily misconstrued. But can the NFS statutes mean something today

note 171, at 793-97; CROSS, supra note 251, at 58-84; John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees
Constitutional? Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. L. REV. 489,
553-67 (2001); KREHBIEL, supra note 80, at 264 (concluding that legislators specialize and acquire expertise
not because it is a common good but because it is in their enlightened self-interest to do so).
272. See EKINS, supra note 255, at 220 (“The particular intention of the group is the intention on
which it acts in any particular legislative act, which is both that for which its act—changes in the law that
are means to valuable ends—and the plan it adopts to introduce those changes—a complex set of meanings
that expresses a complex set of propositions.”); see also Richardson, supra note 256, at 366-75 (arguing that
legislators’ proposals and the willingness inherent therein, combined with the mutual agreements they
achieve in the legislative process, must create a correspondence of intention to will that which is prescribed
by the resulting law).
273. Ekins, building from Bratman’s work, understands group intention as consisting in these
interlocking joint intentions. See EKINS, supra note 255, at 52-57.
274. See id. at 219-22. “[I]ts purpose is to exercise voluntary control over the law and thus to
legislate to change the existing set of legal propositions when there is good reason to do so.” Id. at 219.
275. Cf. WALDRON, DIGNITY, supra note 259, at 134 (“In politics . . . cohesion is not given; rather
it is established in large part by the behavior of the members of the body in question. The very people
who are exhorted (a) to abide by the majority view are also the ones who are exhorted (b) not to secede
and to do their part to hold the body together.”); MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS AND
PRACTICAL REASON 166-67 (1987) (suggesting that planning and deontological constraints serve similar
functions in practical reasoning over time).
276. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline 540 U.S. 581, 591-94 (2004) (deriving an
“idiomatic sense of the statutory phrase” prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age from, among other
things, legislators’ declared intentions to target certain forms of discrimination but not others); Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (observing that the Court’s recourse to legislative history
and other “background,” though not “necessary” because of the statute’s clear phrasing, was useful to meet
objections that the results would be “absurd”).
277. Cf. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 497-98 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Palmer v.
Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83 (1939)) (noting that “[r]eliance on context and structure in statutory
interpretation is a ‘subtle business, calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere rendering
becomes creation and attempted interpretation of legislation becomes legislation itself,’” but that such
reliance was warranted in interpreting the Affordable Care Act); Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002) (interpreting operative provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act in light
of Congress’s enacted findings); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999) (same).
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(or tomorrow) that they have not yet been thought to mean? As the Supreme Court
recently explained in Bostock v. Clayton County,278 the Court
normally interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public
meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment. After all, only
the words on the page constitute the law adopted by Congress and
approved by the President. If judges could add to, remodel,
update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired only by
extratextual sources and our own imaginations, we would risk
amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved for the
people's representatives. And we would deny the people the right
to continue relying on the original meaning of the law they have
counted on to settle their rights and obligations.279
This may sound like simple positivism directing courts to find the meaning
of legislation, not of legislators.280 But note that this “original public meaning”
forecloses the special senses that may attach to legislated texts.281 Textualism’s near
hegemony in the federal courts is being amended here. The interpreter’s “best
inference” about what was intended is to be determinative, even where it “departs
from what is in fact the legislative intent,”282 for there is no other way to interpret a
whole statute without authoring one.283 A whole enactment will characteristically
record the parent chamber’s range and variation, whether justiciable or not, and
whether key legislators spoke to the issue or not.284 As we have noted, the cases

278. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
279. Id. at 1738-39.
280. Cf. Manning, supra note 261, at 696 (“The most basic interpretive premises of textualism do
not contradict, and in fact fit tightly with, core positivist assumptions about interpretation.”); Fallon, supra
note 259, at 289-94.
281. Cf. Doerfler, supra note 256, at 1028 (“Much like textualists, original-public-meaning
originalists . . . rely upon the notion of ‘conventional’ meaning to a greater extent than is, perhaps,
warranted.”); ESKRIDGE, supra note 259, at 13-14 (opposing “statutory archeology” of hidden legislative
intentions to “dynamic interpretation” grounded in the present).
282. EKINS, supra note 255, at 247.
283. See Solan, supra note 255, at 480; see also Doerfler, supra note 256, at 1023-24, 1022 n.227
(arguing that interpretive approaches assuming “reasonable legislators” leave open a range of discretionary
choices but that a fictional “objectified intent” is the only way to supplant such choices); Raz, supra note
20, at 321 (noting that “innovative interpretations” show a text in a new light and cannot be dismissed
simply on the ground that it does not explain existing meanings, but may be dismissed for failing to
account for the features of the text); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 117482 (1993) (arguing that contextualization involves identifying an author’s unarticulated presuppositions
as opposed to imposing one’s own).
284. See Shobe, supra note 266, at 712-13 (arguing that fidelity to Congress requires interpreting
enacted findings and purpose statements as part of the “whole enactment” being construed); Gluck &
Bressman, supra note 171, at 771 (concluding that drafting professionals interviewed generally seek to
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pressed in the federal courts surrounding the NFS statutes have been defined as
much or more by that forum’s limits as by the statutes. In that light, the record
explained above shows that comparatively little has been decided about Congress’s
intentions for the system as a whole. Yet it is this systemic whole that would repay
renewed attention in myriad ways.
B. A Compositional Turn: Making Sense of Parts and Wholes
How should we make the best sense of the NFS statutes? To do so, we
should settle the public meaning of their texts in the context of Congress’s whole
expressed volition. The parent chambers’ average legislators would have understood
the various bills that became the NFS statutes as aiming for something
compositional—coherent and integral. The archaeology285 of various insiders’
thoughts on clearcutting, multiple use, or ecosystems, thus, should yield to
understanding and explaining a whole enterprise aimed, quite simply, at the Forest
Service’s and our deliberate collective improvement sustained over time.
Recall that the parent chambers then, as now, included only a small
minority of members with local interests in NFS land use while many more members
would have taken more diffuse interests in the whole NFS of the present and
future.286 Assuming Congressional choices to delegate reflect some mix of interest
alignment and opportunities for correction,287 as agents of the parent chamber
committees reflect their members’ interests and information—and also how those
may differ from that of the parent chamber.288 Committees, in other words, are never
necessarily acting at their parent chamber’s behest. In our case, the whole Congress
was almost certainly concerned more with the NFS’s total productivity and

encode restraints in statutory delegations to agencies so as to reflect the range of concerns voiced in
Congress).
285. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 259, at 275 (describing and rejecting an “archeological approach” to
legislative intent); cf. Strauss, supra note 53, at 253 (describing statutes’ “political history,” knowledge of
which can make the judiciary a more reliable agent and less given to the interpretive mistakes rooted in
adjudicating particular cases).
286. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
287. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 90, at 14-33; KREHBIEL, supra note 80, at 105-17;
SHEPSLE, supra note 89, at 240-61; Aronson et al., supra note 249, at 37-62. An informational account of
this mix stresses the inducements needed for an agent to be informative to the parent chamber. See
KREHBIEL, supra note 80, at 7-22. Distributional accounts, by contrast, stress that delegations occur only
where members expect to gain more than they lose from delegating and, as Epstein and O’Halloran
showed, “two agent models” that consider delegations to more than one agent tend to raise many more
possibilities than any single agent along that front. See EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 89, at 23236. We may remain neutral as between informational and distributional accounts and still recognize an
expressed volition in the NFS statutes preferring the Service’s pursuit of its constrained optimization be
more transparent to Congress and that it be more successful than it had been to 1974.
288. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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budgetary consequences than with particular units’ local optimizing.289 Finally,
consider how our partisan divisions have left Congresses today—throwing money at
uncontrollable fires in WUI around the West and finding that timber, no longer the
dominant commodity, may soon again be a dominant concern.290
Scholars reconsidering the litigable stakes that animated debate in the 93rd,
94th, or 95th Congresses’ committees291 have, wittingly or not, obscured many of the
public interests bundled within the statutes as a whole.292 They ignored Congress’s
repeated demands for a more urgent pursuit and use of knowledge.293 They have
ignored the centrality of that knowledge (and of money) to constrained optimizations
at scale.294 The Service’s challengers have ignored the Program’s layered assessments
of NFS (and other) renewable resources and how broadscale data of the kind could
inform real performance-based constraints.295 These advocates have had no answers
289. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text; cf. Eskridge, supra note 88, at 288-89 (arguing
that legislation is unlikely to result wherever there is too little “demand” from constituencies needed to
overcome the forces favoring inaction); Roberts, supra note 276, at 565 (considering the 1974 Budget Act
and its diversion of authority to budget committees and their communications through reports); cf.
EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 89, at 236 (“When committees are seen as less reliable agents for
the floor, rational legislative actors can choose to shift more policy-making authority to the executive,
checking both wayward committees and bureaucrats alike by shifting the locus of decision-making
authority from one to the other.”). Budgetary consequences were of more immediate concern to most
members of the 93rd, 94th, and 95th Congresses than land uses in the national forests. See supra notes 9394. Maximizing total productivity may have been more uncertain but was likely no less important. Because
the nation’s welfare weighs so heavily in any total assessment of renewable resources, future productivity
may require that present resource consumption—local or otherwise—not prejudice later uses of the same
resources.
290. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
291. Cf. CLARY, supra note 64, at 192 (calling the FRRRPA and NFMA “a compromise between
forces that supported the widest possible latitude in forestry practices and others that desired highly
prescriptive legislation for the national forests”).
292. For example, Wilkinson and others understandably keyed on the struggle between a short list
of characters in the Senate in explaining the path to Pub. L. No. 94-588. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON,
supra note 59, at 85-90; Cheever, supra note 59, at 635-44. Yet it was a conference of both houses that
fashioned the final bill. Further, out of thirty-five reconciliations, the House bill supplied the provision
fourteen times to the Senate bill’s twelve, with eight compromises and another for an agreed-upon name.
See H.R. Rep. 94-1735 (1976) (Conf. Rep.). Notably, the full Senate voted to approve the Conference
Report without it having been made available to members! See 122 CONG. REC. 33834, 33837 (1976)
(Conf. Rep.) (Senator Randolph remarking that “Members have not been provided with the conference
report and do not have the benefit of the language therein” immediately prior to vote).
293. See supra notes 146-50, 153 and accompanying text.
294. Cf. LE MASTER, supra note 17, at 151-52 (noting significant increases in Forest Service’s
appropriations following enactment of FRRRPA and NFMA and submission of first RPA report through
fiscal years 1976-81). Optimization can be “local” or “global.” Where the former pursues narrower, more
immediate goals, the latter pursues broader, more encompassing goals. See Michael Byron, Satisficing and
Optimality, 109 ETHICS 67, 75-81 (1998). Local optimizing for some narrower goals may be inconsistent
with global optimizing toward encompassing goals and thus may raise doubts about any given choice’s
rationality. Id.
295. O’Toole’s noted attack on below-cost NFS timber sales, for example, focused on the costs of
reforestation, road building and maintenance, soil mitigation, etc. See O’TOOLE, supra note 18, at 26-37.
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for the epistemic traps ecosystem ecology has set for generations of investigators.296
They commandeer Congress’s favored escape valve, the Wilderness Act, yet dismiss
audited self-regulation as the solution Congress turned to in facing its compound
dilemma on the NFS. Finally, fire as a systemic threat to community diversity,
wildlife, timber, and stored carbon can find no urgency in their renditions of
Congress’s intentions for the NFS.
Imagine a collective aim to optimize this whole. If we were choosing
metaphors, the NFS statutes have been understood thus far as a menu of weak,
backward facing constraints arrayed about an original main course in timber.297 From
its first rulemakings implementing the statutes in 1979298 and 1982299 to its overhaul
thereof in 2012,300 the Forest Service has done the same. The better metaphor,
though, is the recipe. Recipes succeed or fail because of their ingredients’ interactions

And although he also noted that such planned sales were irrational for failing to take account of the decadal
assessment data within the relevant forest, see id. at 174-76, his ultimate prescription was for the Service
to return to its decentralized roots to “make the agency more responsive to public demand and changing
tastes,” id. at 194, as if those local tastes should be controlling. The decadal assessments, however, are
ultimately a tool of broader accountability. The Congresses that demanded their creation were surely more
concerned with the information’s availability to subsequent Congresses. Finally, the soundness of prescribed
reforestation regardless of local conditions has grown increasingly doubtful. See North et al., supra note
136, at 219.
296. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
298. See National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 44 Fed. Reg. 53,928
(1979). The 1979 final rule cannily responded to the NFS statutes’ demands with discrete elements for
every unit level plan. See id. at 53,976-92. Unfortunately, each of the elements was itself couched either
in permissive terms or as a localized optimization. See, e.g., id. at 53,990 (setting forth final 36 C.F.R. §
219.13, establishing “[m]anagement standards and guidelines” with modal operators and quantifiers
limiting Forest Service responsibilities to efforts and/or planning deliverables, not outcomes).
299. See National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 47 Fed. Reg. 43,026
(1982). As in 1979, the 1982 revision set out unit-level deliverables and plan elements, this time in a form
that would endure long enough to shape every unit’s plan across the system. But again, the rule listed a
series of content requirements, process steps, and optimizations subject to multiple explicit practicability
limits. See id. at 43,038-52. Tellingly, there were no comments on proposed § 219.15, “[r]esearch,” which
was finalized as proposed. Id. at 43,036.
300. See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,162 (2012). Though
advanced in several respects and much more detailed, the 2012 rule resembled its predecessors structurally.
It required that every LRMP “provide for social, economic, and ecological sustainability,” id. at 21,264,
further specifying that obligation by way of dozens of required “plan components” and “provide for’s.”
See id. at 21,204-07. It specified “timber requirements based on the NFMA,” id. at 21224, “diversity of
plant and animal communities” prerequisites, id. at 21,212-19, and a requirement that every plan “must
provide for ecosystem services and multiple uses.” Id. at 21,219 (explaining § 219.10). Finally, the principal
innovation of the 2012 rule, its detailed subsection on monitoring, maintains a similar posture and requires
that monitoring programs fulfill several prerequisites. See id. at 21,228-38. It specifically states that the
program “does not apply to projects or activities,” 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(a)(7) (2020), and couches its eight
enumerated monitoring questions as those which the monitoring program must “address.” Id. at §
219.12(a)(4).
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in shared space and timing.301 Recipes often change over time out of necessity and
knowing their intent can be vital to guiding that change constructively.302
Congress’s recipe aimed to solve for the epistemic and coordination
challenges entailed in overseeing a constrained optimization carried on continuously
and in parallel at continental, regional, landscape, and local scales.303 The NFS
statutes are best understood as setting expectations on the Service in how the whole
system should be measured and managed. Congress declared in 1960 and again in
1976 that “sustained yield” of the NFS products and services was the “achievement
and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of
the various renewable resources of the national forests without impairment of the
productivity of the land.”304 Land productivity sits at the heart of the whole’s
sustenance. Still, most interpreters have overlooked the interactivity of this
productivity’s parts: planning, doing, and assessing at small, medium, and large
scales.305 Congress’s enacted findings in the statutes are one way to adduce its
reasoning and fill such gaps.306 In reaching for temporal scales of decades and
generations, Congress was intentionally nonspecific as to how local or national
optima were to be defined or pursued in the face of non-complementary goals and
persistent uncertainty. But keying on the statutes’ individual provisions—and ideals
the whole Congress probably did not share—obscures the expressed volition as well
as the trends that are empirically obvious in retrospect: more fire, more wilderness,
301. Michael Dorf and Gary Lawson deserve credit for this metaphor. See Michael C. Dorf, Recipe
for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and Normative Theory, 85 GEO. L.J. 2857, 1858 (1997)
(responding to Lawson’s metaphorical argument).
302. As Dorf says, recipes can be public or private, are adaptable to changes in prevailing
ingredients and tastes, and can even be for a dish no one any longer wants! See id. at 1859-62.
303. These are, roughly, the scales at which Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) sites measure
ecological dynamics and phenomena. See David R. Foster & John D. Aber, Background and Framework for
Long-Term Ecological Research, in FORESTS IN TIME: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF 1,000
YEARS OF CHANGE IN NEW ENGLAND, 3, 17 (David R. Foster & John D. Aber eds., 2004) (describing
1, 10, 100, and 1,000 kilometer scales).
304. Pub. L. No. 86-517, § 4(b), 74 Stat. 215, 215 (1960) (emphasis added); see also Pub. L. No. 94588, § 6(e)(1)-(2), 90 Stat. 2949, 2952 (1976).
305. Planning, doing, and assessing can be sequenced linearly or circularly. See Ralf Yorque et al.,
Toward an Integrative Synthesis, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND
NATURAL SYSTEMS 419 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds. 2002); Carl J. Walters & C.S.
Holling, Large-Scale Management Experiments and Learning by Doing, 71 ECOLOGY 2060 (1990). But as
Walters and Holling argued 30 years ago, “[m]anagement experimentation is often meaningless in settings
where no value is placed on the long-term utility of experimental results.” Id. at 2062. Continued debate
about local, regional, and continental optimization without employing what has been accrued from the
statutes’ 40+ operational years may be “meaningless.” But it remains the norm.
306. Cf. Shobe, supra note 261, at 706 (“Enacted findings and purposes exist as a third, hybrid type
of statutory text that is drafted by political staff yet is in form closer to legislative history. . . . If the goal
of interpretation is to maintain legislative supremacy by relying on texts that are closest to those who are
politically accountable, then courts should consider enacted findings and purposes more closely.”); Crane,
supra note 154, at 662 (“[F]actual findings by Congress may reveal Congress’s reasons for adopting the
statute and hence facilitate judicial review.”).
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and more WUI, new commodities (pellets, NTFPs, mass timber), new uncertainties
(climate change, fuels), new lows (closing forests to the public), and proliferating
judicial precedents.
Predictable budget demands, being informationally efficient, directing that
the Service better resolve the when, where, and why of use incompatibilities, and
dissolving old conflicts with basic, sustained study may exhaust the shared intentions
behind these statutes’ express texts.307 And experiences to date have proven that à la
carte versions of these will disappoint. What we need are mechanisms of
accountability to the whole of them. Instead of reading every missing “shall”/“not”
as a “may” to the Service or its units or implying mandatory language where there is
none, the best inference from the expressed volition in the statutes and our
experiences with them is that Congress’s repeated demands for a “systematic,
interdisciplinary approach”308 joining the biology, economics, and other domain
expertise309 intended that the dynamic, best-available-knowledge optimizations be
coupled with regular oversight.310 The record of choices made and their results was
to enable that oversight. Congress’s repeated statutory findings expecting “scientific
discoveries and technological advances”311 and “new knowledge derived from
coordinated public and private research programs”312 were paired to directives that
the Secretary produce a “comprehensive survey and analysis of the present and
prospective conditions of and requirements for the renewable resources of the forest
and range lands,”313 and that the Secretary “expand research activities to encompass
international forestry and natural resource issues on a global scale.”314 But how to
facilitate all of that and put it to best use?
307. Cf. ROBBINS, supra note 76, at 256 (noting that FRRRPA was “landmark legislation” because
it reorganized federal, state, and private forestry around the decadal reports, documentation, and
predictive analysis); DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 14, at 346 (“Surely, the integration of national and local
land use planning and the linking of budget and land use planning [wa]s a sound step.”); CLAWSON, supra
note 110, at 108 (“All too often in national forest management, ‘multiple use’ has meant a little of
everything everywhere, regardless of costs and of results.”).
308. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b); see also id. at §§ 1604(f)(3), 1604(g)(3)(F)(ii), 1604(h)(1). As Serge
Taylor characterized this same mandate in NEPA, Congress was surely directing its administration to
better emulate the practice of science. See TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 314-24.
309. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(1) (“one integrated plan”); id. at § 1604(g)(3)(A) (“insure
consideration of the economic and environmental aspects of various systems of renewable resource
management”); id. at § 1604(l) (Secretary “shall” estimate “long-term[] costs and benefits” of
implementation).
310. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) (describing the Committee of Scientists’ role); id. at § 1602 (listing
elements of RPA Program for submission to Congress “each fifth fiscal year”); id. § 1606(a) (directing
President to present a “detailed Statement of Policy” describing the RPA “Program”).
311. Pub. L. No. 95-307, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 353, 353 (1978), abrogated by Pub. L. No. 115-334, §§ 820102, 132 Stat. 4490, 4839 (2018).
312. NFMA § 2(4) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1600(4)).
313. FRRRPA § 2(b) (amending McSweeney-McNary Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 702 (1928)), re-enacted
in amended form by NFMA § 2(3) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a)).
314. Pub. L. No. 105-185, § 253, 112 Stat.523, 558 (1998) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1641(c)).
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Knowledge of forest communities (whatever it comes to315) transcends data,
hypotheses, viewpoints, and ultimately ecology’s deep contingency—which is why its
involvement with conservation traces to the origin.316 However, though ecological
knowledge grounded in experimentation, replication, and a lack of
disconfirmations317 has always promised to transform conservation, the very
possibility of that knowledge has long faced serious doubts.318 The Service (or its
Congressional overseers319) must turn the statutes’ operating parts to actively
facilitating the co-evolution of administrative and scientific norms such that, like
statutory programs that have succeeded in the face of persistent scientific doubts, the
decision making itself begets refinement over time.320 Over and above several
consensus measures on data transparency now transforming ecological and
evolutionary research in general,321 the Service should commit to: (1) standardizing

315. This is not the place to litigate the epistemic foundations of knowledge (or justified true
belief!). But it is critical to avoid conflating mere correlations and statistical associations with knowledge
that no one can reasonably deny.
316. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 2-3 (1959); CLARY, supra note 64, at 50-66.
317. Cf. Tilman, supra note 218, at 137-38 (noting that no matter how good statistical correlations
may be, only “appropriately randomized, replicated, interdispersed, and controlled experiments” can yield
causal knowledge of ecological phenomena); Quinn & Dunham, supra note 147, at 611-12 (“[N]o matter
how heuristically desirable it may seem, measuring the impact of biological interaction against the
reference point of a noninteractive null hypothesis is often not a realistically achievable goal.”).
318. See, e.g., Anthony R. Ives, Informative Irreproducibility and the Use of Experiments in Ecology,
68(10) BIOSCIENCE 746 (2018) (arguing that few if any meaningful ecological experiments can be
reproduced); Stefan A. Schnitzer & Walter P. Carson, Would Ecology Fail the Repeatability Test?, 66
BIOSCIENCE 98, 98 (2016) (reporting very low rate of reproduced results in meta-analysis of ecological
experiments).
319. Congress’s trust in its committees, in the Service, or in independent third parties is not easily
grounded with the tools available to novices who must assess experts. See Goldman, supra note 70.
Unfortunately, the tools often turn from the knowledge or expertise at issue toward more collateral
matters. See id. at 105 (“From a practical point of view, information bearing on an expert’s interests is
often one of the more accessible pieces of relevant information that a novice can glean about an expert.”).
Monitoring, information sharing, and feedback are, thus, key to improving the Service’s overall
performance over time. See Kelly & Caldwell, supra note 206, at 211-12.
320. Professor Adler has argued convincingly that the use of Karr’s index of biotic integrity in water
quality monitoring and water quality standards attainment is an exemplar of this co-evolutionary effect.
See Robert W. Adler, Coevolution of Law and Science: A Clean Water Act Case Study, 44 COLUM. J. ENV’T
L. 1 (2019). As national ambient air quality standards’ (NAAQS) pollutant concentrations have been
ratcheted down in step with increasingly sensitive measures of their pollutants’ health effects, persistent
doubts have been resolved by EPA, its Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, and the D.C. Circuit—
the exclusive venue for review—in a unique dialectical process. See Wendy Wagner, It Isn’t Easy Being a
Bureaucratic Expert: Celebrating the EPA’s Innovations, 70 CASE W.L. REV. 1093, 1108-1116 (2020).
Although the NFS statutes lack a special venue provision confining review to one court, the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have been de facto equivalents. Fuller coordination between those two may open one
avenue toward the reforms described here.
321. See Nosek et al., supra note 219; Whitlock, supra note 219.
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its biological units;322 (2) orienting its “habitat analysis” to a more explicitly
experimental posture;323 and (3) striving for total threat awareness as to both
traditional and emergent renewable resources.324 Only by pursuing reforms like these
will the Service progress beyond the beginning stages of its own institutional
evolution in step with Congress’s expressed intentions.
Value conflicts across the NFS will surely continue: optimizing brings
them out,325 pluralistic optimizing even more so.326 Forestry without long-term
accountability, however, is what sparked the legislative revolution of the 1970s.
Continuing the Service’s grand experiments in “learning by doing” without better
data practices, methodological rigor, or management of its productivity’s interacting
parts is a choice to continue the agency’s lagging performance to date.327 The time
for a change, whether through Congress or the White House, is now.328 Renewed
demands for timber in products engineered to work as well or better than steel or
concrete now offer a new carbon sink: urbanization.329 But the frictions inhibiting
such a transformation are sure to worsen without attention to the fundamentals
outlined here.

322. This could involve topographical and/or functional boundary criteria, but it will almost
certainly involve more care and consistency with the “ecosystem” and “population” concepts. See Jax, supra
note 47; MACLAURIN & STERELNY, supra note 47, at 149-71.
323. See Levin, supra note 48 (arguing that the key to predictive understanding is elucidating the
causal mechanisms underlying observed patterns and that the only known method of isolating and
measuring causes is through experimentation); A.J. Underwood, Experiments in Ecology and Management:
Their Logics, Functions and Interpretations, 15 AUSTRAL. J. ECOLOGY 365, 386 (1990) (arguing that
experimental ecology eliminates false models, explanations, and theories and that “applied science”
dismissals of experimentation are too often an apology for bad science).
324. The regulations “shall” “insure research on and (based on continuous monitoring and
assessment in the field) evaluation of the effects of each management system to the end that it will not
produce substantial and permanent impairment of the productivity of the land.” NFMA § 6(g)(3)(C)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(C) (2012)). The best interpretation of this mandate given what has
been learned is nothing less than full threat awareness.
325. See DAVID SCHMIDTZ, RATIONAL CHOICE AND MORAL AGENCY 63 (1995).
326. See JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF
RATIONALITY 180-81 (1989) (arguing that pluralist democracies are likely to do better by trying to do less
because their pluralism is what makes them the least like a rational actor).
327. See Parker et al., supra note 214, at 718 (noting that working scientists’ epistemic dependence
on one another makes progress dependent upon full sharing of data, methodological choices, and
hypothesis testing).
328. Public participatory input of more views, perspectives, or arguments, furthermore, may be of
little practical importance to the reforms suggested here. See Herz, supra note 57, at 376-77.
329. See Pub. L. No. 105-185, § 253, 112 Stat. 523, 558 (2018) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1641(a)(3)(6)). Notably, the Service’s own Forest Products Laboratory (FPL) has led research into next generation
uses of wood like mass timber to replace steel and concrete in urban development. Carbon stored in
construction materials is not in the atmosphere, see Skog et al., supra note 242, at 672-74, and many NFS
units are currently seeing historic timber sale backlogs, see R45688, supra note 129, at 7-10, 15-16.
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V. CONCLUSION
As fire and climate change impede more NFS objectives like the
maintenance of biotic and community diversity or appropriate reforestation, the
Forest Service’s overall performance has grown increasingly suspect.330 Though
much of it may be no fault of the agency’s, the legislative intent behind its enabling
statutes is not being realized. Where economic goods may naturally tend toward
equilibrating supply and demand, public good optimality must depend on
compulsory mechanisms.331 In light of Congress’s stated objectives, though, the range
of “soft” constraints on the Service—especially those pertaining to monitoring,
research, and assessment—must be better ordered and hardened. Too often
interpreters have invoked the intentions of a minority in the 1970s Congresses to
obscure this insight, a minority disproportionately concerned with local NFS unitlevel optima. From there, the confusions have only deepened. The NFS statutes’
subtle mandates and varied modalities are easily obscured, but Congress’s overall
work product was deliberately tailored to the two distinct problems we have
highlighted throughout: Congress’s epistemic and coordinative dilemmas.
Whatever finally causes a landscape’s permanent impairment, if we cannot
recognize it in time, is knowledge not worth what it cost to acquire. Pressing the
point landscape by landscape can hardly be the best interpretation of the NFS
statutes. As more units are choking on fuels and losing biodiversity while
simultaneously lagging in productivity and functionality, the need to do better has
never been more urgent or obvious. A lack of sufficiently fixed litigable interests may
have insulated much of this from judicial oversight, but it should not diminish the
force of our statutes. Interpreted together, they could become more than a sum of
their parts.

330. The carbon storage and cycling consequences of fire regimes are quickly becoming premiere
research questions, see Kalies & Kent, supra note 237, at 92-93, Table 3, as are soil conditions and net
primary productivity in the wake of major fires, id. at 91.
331. See PIERSON, supra note 79, at 30-36.
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